Ministry of National Security

A New Era of Policing in Jamaica: Transforming the JCF

The report of the JCF Strategic Review Panel
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1. Executive summary

The pattern and high incidence of criminality in Jamaica over recent years has sparked profound concern at the local, national and international levels. Current trends in violent crime reflect deep-rooted social problems and a lack of social cohesion. General public distrust of the police and incidences of police corruption have created an uneasy distance between the police and citizens. This hinders investigative efforts as many persons are afraid or unwilling to come forward as witnesses and a majority of serious crimes remain unsolved or unreported. The security situation and ineffective security governance arrangements undermine Jamaica’s ability to establish and maintain a viable economy that can sustain acceptable levels of well-being for the majority of its citizens. Finally, it is widely believed that the security situation is deteriorating and that decisive action is required to turn the situation around quickly and fundamentally.

It is against this backdrop that, in mid 2007, the Ministry of National Security (MNS) commissioned a strategic review of the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF). A strategic review panel, comprising domestic and international experts, was established for this purpose. Our mandate was to create a new vision for security governance within Jamaica. As part of this, we were to review the governance, management structures, key infrastructure, standards and performance of the JCF and make appropriate recommendations for reform. The major objectives in accomplishing this included:

- enhancement of accountability mechanisms governing the operations of the JCF;
- the development of recommendations to ensure professionalism, efficiency and enhanced competence of the entire organisation;
- establishment of appropriate standards in recruitment, training and professional development to ensure adherence to internationally accepted best practices;
- improvement of public confidence in policing;
- review of the legislative and administrative framework governing the JCF, including the Jamaica Constabulary Force Act.

Our task was to develop a set of proposals that would enable the Government of Jamaica (GoJ) to meet its responsibilities towards ensuring a safe and secure Jamaica through a properly governed, professional and accountable police service working in partnership with other elements of government and civil society.

Our approach involved reviewing available documentation and literature relating to JCF performance, together with a series of public consultations and discussions with stakeholders from the JCF, the Government and civil society. The consultations were intended to provide the perspectives and views of citizens and stakeholders with regards to their experience of the police and policing reform. These were supplemented by four targeted reviews commissioned to examine the legislation and policy framework supporting police governance, as well as the JCF management structure. We also reflected upon the six previous reviews of the JCF conducted over the last two decades and the efforts made by the JCF during that period to achieve a fundamental move towards becoming a modern police service.
This report sets out an integrated suite of recommendations that if implemented in a coordinated fashion, will bring about this fundamental reform and enable the Government to meet its responsibility for a safe and secure Jamaica.

1.1 Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations

We identified a number of issues requiring attention. However, there are five overarching areas that, combined, have profound implications for the effective functioning of the police and its ability to maintain safety and security. We focused on these areas during the review. They are:

- culture;
- corruption and human rights;
- internal and external accountability;
- leadership and management;
- professional development.

In total, we have provided 124 recommendations relating to the above areas. While each recommendation is important, for the purposes of this Executive Summary, we have chosen to specify only those that for the general reader will provide an overall sense of the direction we propose to address the most critical issues facing the JCF.

1.1.1 Culture

The dominant culture of the JCF is incongruent with that required of a modern-day police service. Its stated values, “We serve, protect and reassure with courtesy, integrity and proper respect for the rights of all”, do not represent the dominant culture of the JCF nor how the public perceive the police. The dominant culture is that of command and control; it is severely hindering its effectiveness and its implications run deep. It:

- promotes insularity, thus serving to distance the police from communities;
- serves as a barrier to effective communications across the Force and with the community and stakeholders;
- impedes sound decision making and problem solving;
- inhibits attraction of the best and brightest recruits;
- demands obedience and silences alternative viewpoints, stifling creativity and initiative;
- promotes risk aversion;
- fosters a culture of fear, subservience and negative subcultures;
harms morale and employee engagement.

The dominant JCF culture has clearly developed and become deeply entrenched over a period of years. Previous reform efforts have not specifically focused on addressing cultural issues, preferring to focus instead on more tangible changes to systems and processes. We believe that this has been an omission; what is required is a concerted, long term and coordinated effort to tackle the negative aspects of the current culture on a number of different levels. Behaviour, beliefs, attitudes and ways of working must all be changed through a range of interventions targeted at improving leadership capacity, management effectiveness, professional skills and integrity and accountability. We have made recommendations to tackle each of these areas. However, they must be implemented in a resolute and coordinated manner and cultural change made a central theme of all implementation activities (Recommendation 1).

1.1.2 Corruption and Human Rights Abuses

The Government, the current commissioner, academia, independent international human rights organisations and the media have all publicly acknowledged and denounced the various forms of corruption that permeate the JCF. This is often positioned against a backdrop of general corruption within elements of Jamaican society as a whole. Intertwined with problems of corruption is a general lack of regard by the police for human rights. The media reports almost daily on issues ranging from alleged involvement in murder to the general manner in which the police interact with citizens. Perhaps most troubling to us has been the historical inability on the part of the JCF leadership and Government to turn this around.

There is general agreement that a failure to act cohesively against corruption will continue to undermine the effectiveness of the JCF and the safety, security and economic prosperity in Jamaica. Key recommendations include:

- full implementation of the JCF anti-corruption policy (Recommendation 8);
- an immediate security vetting initiative to ensure the JCF leadership is corruption-free; a fundamental requirement in preparing to implement anti-corruption measures throughout the organisation (Recommendation 10);
- use of polygraph testing as a key component of a revised security vetting process particularly for certain key and sensitive positions;
- a greater emphasis placed on human rights in training and included in all senior managers’ performance plans with regular evaluation against targets in this area (Recommendation 23).

1.1.3 Accountability

Internal accountability in police and security organisations generally comprises a blend of management and discipline. Managers at all levels must ensure their subordinates know exactly what is expected of them in their day to day work and how this contributes to the organisation’s strategic goals. Similarly, staff must be held to account for their performance in the achievement of organisational and individual objectives. There is little evidence
indicating that such a culture exists within the JCF.

Internal accountability within the JCF is weak. While the JCF's vision for reform is set out in its Corporate Strategy, there is no overarching police plan to manage the implementation of that vision and no effective performance appraisal system to manage individual performance. The JCF's discipline system is punishment-based rather than emphasising remedial action and learning – key characteristics of a modern professional standards programme. The process is ineffective and often circumvented; a backlog of over 500 discipline cases exists, some of these dating back to 2000.

There are currently three formal external oversight bodies that are intended to complement Ministerial accountability and responsibility. They are the Police Services Commission (PSC), the Police Civilian Oversight Authority (PCOA) and the Police Public Complaints Authority (PPCA). None of these organisations is fully effective. While the functions of each are legitimate, their execution by three bodies is, in our view inefficient, ineffective and serves to diffuse accountability by creating confusion for the public and police.

Key recommendations include:

- implementation of an effective corporate and operational planning and budgeting process linked to implementation of an effective performance appraisal system for all staff in the JCF (Recommendations 13, 17);
- merger of the PCOA with the PSC to form a single management oversight body; the new PSC will assume and expand upon existing PCOA responsibilities concerning JCF management and performance (Recommendations 38, 41);
- redefinition of the relationship between the Ministry of National Security and the PSC with regard to their relative responsibilities for planning and holding the JCF to account for its performance (Recommendations 47, 48);
- establishment of a performance contract between the PSC and the Commissioner of Police setting out objectives and targets against which the Commissioner's performance will be evaluated (Recommendation 43);
- disbandment of the PPCA and merger of its functions into the proposed Independent Commission for Investigations (Recommendation 49);
- initiation of a comprehensive review of the JCF discipline system to bring it into line with modern practices combined with immediate effort to eliminate the backlog of discipline cases (Recommendations 26, 28, 29).

1.1.4 Leadership and Management

During the Review, it was clear that there has been disappointment among critical stakeholders in the JCF’s leadership culture and effectiveness over the years. Most JCF managers have spent their entire careers in the organisation. With no other experience, they have both managed and been promoted through a maze of ineffective systems, poor culture and internal politics. In certain respects, this has limited their individual and collective capacity to change these very same organisational elements that are severely limiting the JCF from modernising.
There has been insufficient focus on developing leadership and management skills and potential in the JCF over recent years leading to a decline in leadership and management skills across the organisation. Command courses do not meet the needs of modern police managers and the existing professional HR function is inadequately staffed to manage training and development, career progression, promotion and succession planning. In addition, the organisation is constrained by multiple layers of ineffective command and control structures which are incongruent with the needs of a modern policing service and serve to cause confusion over where responsibility and accountability for actions lie. The Commissioner also is constrained by the legislative and regulatory framework.

The present situation calls for an immediate increased focus on the development of leadership and management skills, along with clarification of management roles and responsibilities throughout the organisation and particularly between headquarters, areas and divisions.

Key recommendations include:

- clarification of the role of JCF Headquarters in relation to the Areas and Divisions to promote greater managerial effectiveness and accountability (Recommendation 56);
- establishment of a more robust senior decision-making framework and structure, with current arrangements reorganised into a Senior Executive Committee (comprising the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners) and a subordinate level Senior Management Team [comprising the Commissioner, Deputy and Assistant Commissioner levels] (Recommendations 53, 54);
- establishment of structured processes for strategic planning and performance management (Recommendations 13–22);
- development of a clear set of policing priorities over a three (3)-year horizon embedded in a three (3) year policing plan, and development of annual policing plans that include objectives, performance indicators and targets for the whole Force (Recommendation 13);
- enhancement of leadership and management training arrangements and the implementation of career development and succession planning systems to identify and prepare prospective managers and leaders (Recommendations 98-99);
- divestment of some non-core functions, such as the guarding and transport of prisoners, and fleet management and repair (Recommendations 63, 64);
- implementation of a rigorous programme of civilianisation of non-police functions (Recommendations 67–69).

### 1.1.5 Towards a more professional service

The JCF is currently facing a crisis in recruitment and retention of a competent and motivated workforce. The challenge of staffing up to its current establishment of 10,000 has been severely impacted by a range of negative aspects relating to the way the Force manages the interests and well-being of its staff, namely:
• limited professional HR management, linked to training, development and career management;

• inadequate compensation;

• limited respect for work/life balance issues;

• workplace health and safety, relating particularly to working conditions and limited vehicles and equipment;

• a training facility whose physical plant falls well short of that expected of a modern police recruit and in-service training facility.

In essence, the way the JCF is approaching the management and care of its staff is impacting negatively on its overall ability to attract suitably qualified staff and create and maintain a balanced and uncorrupted workforce. If the JCF really is to transform itself into a modern police service, it is imperative that these issues be resolved. Key recommendations include:

• appointment of a civilian Head of Corporate Services to manage all support services and HR issues (Recommendation 67);

• enhancement of the JCF professional HR Unit to manage all HR policies and procedures, including recruitment, training, career development, performance, promotion, compensation, reward, benefits and welfare (Recommendation 71);

• enhancement of the recruiting programme to ensure that only those who meet basic requirements and security screening are admitted, and that the programme achieves its intended results in an effective manner (Recommendations 74, 76–79, 81, 82);

• major capital investment in the physical training plant at Twickenham Park (Recommendation 83);

• elimination of weight, height and age restrictions for new recruits (Recommendation 75);

• revitalisation of the Graduate Entry Programme to ensure a steady inflow of highly educated persons into the JCF (Recommendation 80);

• updating of the JCF learning strategy and tactics to align them with the needs of a modern police service (Recommendations 89–93);

• placing emphasis on improving and implementing supervisory and management development courses (Recommendation 92);

• enforcement of the principles of transparency and merit in the promotion system, and monitoring to ensure compliance (Recommendations 94, 96, 99);

• reviewing the existing rank structure and corresponding compensation scheme for the JCF to ensure that the structure is appropriate and that members are fairly compensated (Recommendations 100, 101);
• major capital investment to bring police stations and buildings up to an acceptable standard that both meets the needs of staff and is attractive to potential recruits (Recommendations 102, 103);

• development of a comprehensive IT strategy and roll out of ICT infrastructure in tandem with specialist IT systems (Recommendations 104–112).

1.2 Implementing Reform

The challenge now facing the Government lies in how to execute the transformation of the JCF and its oversight mechanisms in an effective manner, ensuring that the reforms are sustained over time. We have given careful consideration to implementation, which we expect will take at least three years based on a well-planned and managed approach. We believe the following are necessary to ensure effective implementation:

• creation of a Policing Reform Commission (PRC) for a period of three to five years to monitor, guide and support the implementation of the reform (Recommendation 117);

• effort by the PRC to work collaboratively with key stakeholders during the reform process and monitor police performance (Recommendations 118, 119);

• appointment by the Commissioner of Police of a senior level JCF officer to act as Implementation Manager to lead the transformation process, supported by a small internal team, a police advisor and technical assistance (Recommendations 113–114);

• development of a comprehensive communications plan to keep the Government, Parliamentarians, civil society, citizens and police staff and partners well informed and engaged in the reform process (Recommendations 120–122).

As part of the implementation of the communications strategy, the Commissioner, in partnership with the PRC, Ministry of National Security and other key stakeholders, should agree on an appropriate date for an official relaunch of the police service. This date should take into account progress being made in key areas of reform. The relaunch should include the introduction of new symbols and value statements and the renaming of the JCF as the Jamaica Police Service to emphasise the ethos of service to community. Uniform and other symbols should be redesigned and relaunched for the same reason (Recommendations 4–6).

1.3 Conclusion

We believe that the implementation of the suite of reforms proposed in this report should yield a significant return for all Jamaicans in terms of the overall impact and effectiveness of their police service. We expect that, at the end of the reform process, there will be a well constituted, managed and led Jamaica Police Service, better able to collaborate and partner effectively with communities and civil society, leading to enhanced accountably and tangible and measurable improvements in crime reduction and overall safety and security.
2. Introduction to the main report

The pattern and high incidence of criminality in Jamaica over recent years has sparked profound concern at the local, national and international levels. Current trends in violent crime reflect deep social problems resulting from dysfunctional relationships in communities and a general lack of social cohesion. Escalating criminality in communities, particularly among young men, highlights the complexity of attempting to improve public safety through effective and appropriate law enforcement. The interaction between failing physical and social structures, with high rates of unemployment among young men and a history of conflict with the police, sets the stage for numerous challenges relating to the policing of communities, maintaining public order and mitigating serious violent crimes.

The nexus between crime, communities and specific social groups is central to the environment in which the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) operates. General distrust of the police by the public, and perceptions of police corruption have created an uneasy distance between the police and citizens. As such, policing efforts in some communities are frustrated as community residents - in anticipation of confrontation - act defensively in their contact with the police. In particular, the lack of trust between citizens and the police hinders investigative efforts as many persons are afraid or unwilling to come forward as witnesses. The result of this is that an overwhelming majority of serious crimes committed in communities remain unsolved and sometimes go unreported.

Traditionally, the JCF has been organised and structured primarily to respond to local criminal activity and public disorder. In recent times, however, the number of dangerous threats to Jamaican society, some of which are transnational in nature, has increased. Examples include the various forms of cyber crime; complex fraud schemes; human trafficking; and a range of other organised criminal and terrorism-related activities. Many of these criminal endeavours are highly sophisticated, making detection and prosecution of those behind the threats difficult. Collectively, they represent significant threats to the national security and well-being of Jamaicans.

A police service organised almost exclusively to deal with traditional types of crime and public order is often not ideally prepared with respect to these types of emerging issues. Add to this a multitude of changes occurring at the national and international levels that are converging to have profound implications for policing organisations around the world. Chief amongst these are increasing demands and expectations for greater accountability for the effective and efficient delivery of policing services.

Some of these trends occurring in the policing environment may appear innocuous, others more profound. But what is undeniable is that:

- the pace of change in response to evolving expectations is outpacing the abilities of many police organisations to adapt;
- meeting these expectations for producing safety and security will require greater sophistication and collaborative working by the police and others.

The implications for policing in Jamaica are significant.
2.1 Aim of the Strategic Review

In mid 2007, against this backdrop, and in keeping with its commitment to completely modernise law enforcement infrastructure as set out in the National Security Policy, the Ministry of National Security (MNS) commissioned a Strategic Review of the JCF. The Strategic Review was intended to provide the empirical bases for the adoption of strategies and plans to enhance and strengthen the capacity of the JCF to better fulfil its mandate.

The aim of the strategic review was to examine thoroughly the policies, standards and performance of the JCF, and make recommendations aimed at establishing internationally accepted policing standards for the Force. The major objectives for the Review included:

- enhancement of accountability mechanisms governing the operations of the JCF;
- the development of recommendations to ensure professionalism, efficiency and enhanced competence of the entire organisation;
- development of appropriate standards in recruitment, training and professional development to ensure adherence to internationally accepted best practices;
- improvement of public confidence in policing;
- review of the legislative and administrative framework governing the JCF, including the Jamaica Constabulary Force Act.

2.2 Approach and conduct

The review began in July 2007 and was concluded in April 2008.

To undertake the review on its behalf, the MNS established a strategic review panel. This Panel included:

- local and international law enforcement experts;
- individuals with experience in the management of complex private and public sector organisations;
- senior academics with expertise in such areas as governance and policing reform.

The panel comprised:

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<td>Dr Herbert Thompson – President,</td>
<td>Cal Corley - Chief Superintendent - Royal</td>
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<td>Northern Caribbean University</td>
<td>Canadian Mounted Police, Ottawa, Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shirley Tyndall – Former Financial Secretary,</td>
<td>John Yates – Assistant Commissioner - Metropolitan</td>
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<td>Ministry of Finance and Planning</td>
<td>Police, London, United Kingdom</td>
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<td>Peter Moses – Vice-president of Citibank</td>
<td>Clifford Shearing – Chair of Criminology,</td>
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The specific Terms of Reference (TORs) developed to guide us in the strategic review covered a range of areas, including assessing the effectiveness and relevance of current policing strategies, assessing operational competencies and effectiveness, reviewing various institutional issues, such as the suitability of the current organisational structure and management arrangements, and the mandate and effectiveness of current oversight bodies. The full TORs can be found at Appendix B. We were supported in our work by a small Secretariat and four consultants who carried out specific reviews on our behalf.

To allow for greater probing into the key areas set out in the TORs, to break the work into manageable packages and to encourage stakeholder participation, we identified and aligned our efforts to three main areas, covering these in some depth:

- governance and oversight;
- management and organisation structure;
- key enabling infrastructure, e.g. HR management, recruitment, promotion, training.

For each, we conducted a review of available documentation and literature, including previous reviews of the JCF. This was supplemented by a series of public consultations and discussions with stakeholders within the JCF, the Government and civil society. The consultations were intended to provide the perspectives and views of citizens and other stakeholders with regard to their experience of the police and policing reform. The public consultations featured fourteen (14) sessions conducted across Jamaica between November 12 and December 14, 2007. The output of the public consultations is further referred to in the main body of this report and a fuller summary can be found at Appendix D.

In addition, four specific reviews were commissioned to look in more depth at the following four areas:

- JCF Act and other enabling legislation;
- JCF Book of Rules, Standing Orders and Police Service Regulations;
- administration of the JCF;
- management and organisational structure of the JCF.

### 2.3 Format of this report

After this introduction, this report is structured as follows:

Section 3 – Towards a modern police service;
Section 4 – Changing the culture;
Section 5 – Tackling corruption;
Section 6 – Building an accountability framework;
Section 7 – A more effective leadership and management arrangement;
Section 8 – Towards a more professional JCF;
Section 9 – Implementing the changes.
Section 10 – Immediate next steps;

A separate document contains the appendices relevant to this report. These are:
Appendix A – Biographies of Panel Members;
Appendix B – Terms of Reference;
Appendix C – List of persons consulted;
Appendix D – Summary of public consultations;
Appendix E – Summaries of previous reviews;
Appendix F – Current JCF structure;
Appendix G – Salary comparisons;
Appendix H – Action plan;
Appendix I – Full List of Recommendations;
Appendix J – Proposed organisation structure.
3. Towards a modern police service

Safety and security exists when the actions of the people within a society collectively support and enact peaceful ways of living; that is, when a culture of peace is widespread within a society. A central role of Government is to facilitate the accomplishment of a peaceful culture. Such peace is best achieved when a critical mass of people within a society are mobilised and coordinated so as they accomplish it. This is achieved by the extent to which the authorities – particularly governments – are able to engage enough citizens to support relevant initiatives. One such initiative is for governments to punish persons who do not act peacefully. This is typically referred to as ‘law enforcement’.

Law enforcement seeks to ‘correct’ offenders and deter would-be offenders through punishment and the threat of punishment, as well as through incapacitation and rehabilitation. The higher purpose of ‘law enforcement’ should be to engage citizens so that they act peacefully themselves and promote peace among others. The law enforcement system works best when it is part of a wider repertoire of means used to promote peace. It is best used as a ‘back-up’ system that comes into effect when other means fail. Law enforcement is also used to respond to situations where non-negotiable force is required.

In summary, peace is achieved best when a variety of means are identified, mobilized and coordinated. These means include other capacities within government (within and outside of criminal justice) as well as means located within the broader society. These broader means are located within the private or business sector as well as within the civil society or community sector.

A good policing system is one that identifies, mobilises and coordinates a wide range of resources across society so that they form part of a policing or security governance system that effectively and legitimately promotes peace. In such a system, the Government, through its agencies, has a key role to play, both as coordinator of a security governance network, as well as a direct contributor to such governing networks.

3.1 Guiding principles

To establish a benchmark for a modern police service against which we could assess the JCF, we established a set of guiding principles. The guiding principles are also intended to help clarify the leadership and learning culture that must be developed by the JCF in the pursuit of the Government’s vision for policing and, in due course, support the Commissioner and others to make well-informed decisions relating both to the reform and day to day operational and administrative matters.

We considered the role of a modern police organisation in the context of the following criteria:

- a primary focus on the protection of human rights and building safety and security as key outcomes;
- accountability;
- effective and efficient management;
• the need to integrate policing efforts with others to achieve community-focused results;

• values and ethics.

3.1.1 Human Rights

Human rights have come to define what is meant by ‘security’. In today’s world, to be secure is to enjoy fundamental human rights. This understanding of security is now widely shared around the globe. To govern security means to govern in ways that ensure human rights are protected. As the primary guardians of security within a society, police are the primary guardians of human rights; thus policing, by definition, means protecting human rights.

3.1.2 Accountability

A central feature of a democracy is that its government is accountable to the people who have collectively granted them authority to govern. Police are accountable to both government and the people who elect the government but, for this to become a reality, it must be possible to hold them to account for what they do. This requires the government and public to have knowledge of what the police do and for there to be appropriate levels of transparency that enable the police to fulfil their role while being held accountable for the way in which they do so. However, it should be emphasised that day to day operational decision making rests with the police.

3.1.3 Effective Management

The police service must be organised to provide value for money and to set the highest standard for public service. It must manage its finite resources efficiently so as to produce effective outcomes. This requires:

• highly skilled, knowledgeable, professional staff, capable of critical thinking and constantly aware of – and adaptable to – patterns and trends occurring in the operating environment at the local, national, regional and international levels;

• management systems that reflect current managerial practice and theory;

• both competent managers and competent leaders who together with employees and other partners, implement and inspire others towards strategic objectives and outcomes;

• leaders, managers and employees skilled at building networks both inside and outside the policing sector;

• the appointment of well-qualified and well-trained managers at all levels, who are given the space and resources to manage while being held accountable for their actions;

• managing resources in the most efficient and effective way, given the environment and resources available;
leaders who will encourage all personnel to constantly gain a better understanding of the knowledge that is required to support the complex duties and tasks they undertake;

a nurturing work environment that stimulates learning;

an internal leadership culture that is open to new perspectives, ideas and ways of doing business;

partnerships that create an opportunity for all parties and employees to gain further insight into the multiple contributing factors to the often complex issues they face;

supporting, in new ways, ‘front-line’ service delivery staff. This should involve better ‘front-line’ leadership, more rotation, more exposure to relevant experts, access to police and public policy literature and research, enriched job design and a system of reward and recognition that will enable the organisation to attract, develop and retain quality people;

reducing unnecessary bureaucracy. Today’s police organisation must be flexible and adaptable. There is considerable need for diversity, flexibility and creativity and the policing model must ensure greater integration between the various arms of policing together with communities and civil society;

the leveraging of available technology;

refocusing on areas of core competence by outsourcing some non-core functions.

3.1.4 Integration and partnerships

The central concept of the 19th and 20th century police organisation was that it would monopolise the governance of security. Not only would police be responsible for preventing disorder, but they would be responsible for restoring peace once it was broken. Others might assist, but it was the police who were responsible for policing. This concept of policing is no longer viable. Modern, effective police understand that they alone cannot hope to govern security and respond to insecurity when it occurs in today’s complex and multi-faceted world. They understand that while they have a unique role, they govern security best when they act in partnership with others. While part of a network that provides security and acknowledging that they cannot govern security alone, the police do have a crucial and unique role to play:

first, the police are agents of governments that in turn are responsible for guaranteeing the safety and security of people within their territories;

second, police have been granted (by governments and the people who elect them) special rights (police powers) to use force in governing security.

These two features set police apart as critical players in the governance of security. Modern, progressive police organisations recognise this and use both these features as essential guides in establishing partnerships to govern security. In particular, this means three things:

the police have a special responsibility to see to it that security is effectively
governed;

- the police have a responsibility to use force when it is needed to govern security;
- the police have a responsibility to act when others are not available or are unwilling to act.

These three features of the police role define the way in which they should facilitate and engage in networks. Such networks often extend to other police and security organisations, both domestically and internationally, as well as with private security firms. Furthermore, extensive collaboration with other public sector and not-for-profit sector organisations in such areas as education, social services and health are often engaged.

3.1.5 Values and ethics – a corruption-free workplace

It is widely held that the authority and resources accorded to governments should be used to promote public rather than private advantage. At the very heart of this principle is an acknowledgement that the police, like any other government organisation, should not use their power and authority to benefit themselves illegitimately. No police organisation that does not take a firm and tough stance against corruption can be either legitimate or effective.

Police leaders must have the means to deal firmly with corruption. Without this, no police leader can manage effectively or help create a police organisation that is widely respected by those it serves. While the right of people to defend themselves against charges of corruption is vital, these should be provided for in ways that enable anti-corruption campaigns to be effectively pursued.

As there is widespread agreement that corruption has been a problem within JCF, there is no more important principle that should be followed in creating a new era of policing within Jamaica.

3.2 Prior reform efforts

We took time to review and reflect upon the six major reviews of the Constabulary conducted over the last 18 years\(^1\); these were important to our understanding of what has been successful in the past at bringing about reform and what has not. We were struck by the number of commonalities across each of those reports, and indeed how in many respects they aligned with our own findings and conclusions. A summary of recommendations made in these previous reviews can be found at Appendix E. While some were implemented, for the most part they were not.

The most recent attempt by the JCF to realise the shift to modern policing began in 1997 when the JCF established a five-year corporate strategy which set out a vision for reform. The first strategy was conceived out of the need for the JCF to formulate new practices and operations to deal with the escalating challenges associated with crime and disorder and the need to engage more productively with citizens. The Corporate Strategy was revised and reissued in 2005 to provide a framework for a second phase of reform covering 2005-8. The

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2005 Corporate Strategy has a number of priorities:

- building capacity to manage criminal intelligence;
- further work on community policing and crime prevention;
- revision of policies on human rights and the use of force;
- improving the JCF physical infrastructure;
- improving leadership and management capacity;
- improving the quality of traffic management.

The implementation of the JCF’s Corporate Strategy has been supported by the UK, US and Canadian governments. While reform efforts have focused on many areas, including HR development, traffic management, witness management and the establishment of a professional standards capability, the majority of the JCF’s efforts have been directed towards establishing divisional primacy (which is now rolled out in all 19 divisions), establishing community policing and increasing intelligence and investigative capacity.

Furthermore, the MNS has been supporting JCF reform through the implementation of new technologies such as a new Automated Palm and Fingerprint Identification System (APFIS) and an Integrated Ballistics Identification System. These systems are discussed further at Section 8.

### 3.3 Public expectations of their relationship with the police

In addition to establishing guiding principles against which to assess JCF effectiveness and reviewing previous reform efforts, we wanted to hear what a cross section of the Jamaican population and civil society had to say about their police service and their aspirations and hopes for a more peaceful society. There was a profound commonality to what they told us. In essence, Jamaicans, regardless of political affiliation, religious beliefs, gender, ethnicity or economic status, told us that:

- they want a more trusting and responsive relationship with the police;
- they want to feel assured that they will be treated fairly and with respect to their human rights and dignity regardless of the nature of their dealings with the police;
- they are tired of the violence and corruption that permeate and are eroding Jamaican society. Therefore:
  - ensuring the safety and security of all Jamaicans and those visiting the island is paramount. For example, from the business sector, we heard how important a safe and secure Jamaica is to promoting business and economic development;
  - corruption must be eradicated, both within the police and across Jamaican society;
- finally, we were impressed by the strong desire and willingness within civil society and among average Jamaicans to work in partnership with the police to achieve these ends.

We also listened intently to those who expressed frustration and concern over the number of previous studies and reviews whose sound recommendations for police reform have largely gone unimplemented. How, they asked, will this strategic review be any different? We can assure the public that we have taken this message seriously. The concerns are legitimate and served to galvanise our resolve to make what we believe are sound recommendations for deep reform, complemented by well-informed guidance concerning the implementation of those recommendations. We are confident that this will substantially increase the opportunity for success.

### 3.4 Acknowledgements

By its very nature, in the remainder of this report we examine issues and reach conclusions, many of which are constructively critical of the JCF. We feel it vital at this juncture to clearly acknowledge the contributions to public safety being made by the many highly dedicated, professional, caring and community-oriented employees at all levels of the JCF, many of whom we met during the course of the Review. Their contributions, under the circumstances we will set out in of the following sections, are to be commended.

The average JCF employee is honest and sincere, bringing his or her best to work every day with the hope of contributing to safer communities. Unfortunately, operating conditions are often incongruent with achieving these aims. Despite good intentions, the JCF has lacked the individual and collective leadership necessary to turn itself around and inspire the organisation to new levels of performance and community-oriented outcomes – in particular a safe and secure Jamaica for all.

All members of this Panel sincerely wish to acknowledge those employees who have endured and continue to serve their country with integrity, respect and compassion. In many ways, this report is dedicated to them. Like the general public, whose calls for reform have been loud and clear, their hopes for a brighter future must also be inspired.

The Panel also wishes to express sincere gratitude to the hundreds of Jamaicans across the length and breadth of the country who took the time out to participate in the public consultations and to share your dreams and aspirations for the JCF and security in Jamaica. We heard you and we hope that you will find your concerns and solutions reflected in the pages of this report. Special thanks to the Social Development Commission who mobilised the communities to participate in this process and to Leahcim T. Semaj and Company who managed the discussions. Special thanks also to the vast array of civil society groups and human rights organisations that made contributions and submissions. This has helped greatly to the richness and substance of the report.
4. Changing the culture

While there are several definitions of organisation culture, essentially it means ‘how we do things around here’. Every organisation has a distinct culture which can be visible in a number of ways, including:

- how decisions are made and unstructured/complex problems solved;
- how power and authority are exercised;
- how open communications are (vertically and horizontally);
- how rewards are distributed;
- whether senior leaders are more oriented towards ‘leadership or ‘management;
- whether the organisation tends to be:
  - results oriented or more bureaucratically inclined;
  - inclined towards risk-taking or risk-avoiding;
  - client-oriented or insular.

Culture governs what is acceptable and what is not, and the rules and norms of behaviour in an organisation; every aspect of an organisation’s operation is affected and most importantly its ability to interact, adapt and change. Many things influence the culture of an organisation, including its people, working environment, its leadership and management style, mission statement and objectives, technology, communication and history.

The power of culture should not be underestimated. It can impede an organisation’s ability to operate effectively, to adapt and respond to new trends. If not recognised and managed it can eventually influence every aspect of an organisation and become more impactful on the way the organisation operates than the management and leadership itself.

4.1 The current JCF culture

During this review, words and phrases to describe the dominant culture within the JCF included: inwardly/entitlement focused, change-resistant, low trust, silo, closed society, process focused (not results oriented), hierarchical, militaristic, low people focus, fear-based and repressive, not accountable, responsibility delegated upward, little if any community-orientation, and male-dominated. At those locations where there is effective leadership, management and supervision, it appears to be more by a function of the people themselves rather than any organisational design.

Specifically, consultations, including those with JCF staff, suggested that the dominant culture of JCF is one:

- where staff are subject to fear and intimidation;
• where seniority and position are used as a tool of intimidation;

• where a ‘blame’ and ‘fault’ culture inhibits willingness to accept responsibility by subordinate staff;

• where ‘lessons learned’ are not encouraged as part of normal organisational development;

• that is risk averse; it is unwise to suggest innovation or challenge a position, as to do so risks being shunned by one’s managers and/or peers;

• where managers and supervisors favour some staff over others and systems for reward and advancement are not transparently operated;

• where processes that encourage participation, dialogue and respect for alternative viewpoints and debate are stifled;

• where there is a heavy reliance on rules to guide and dictate behaviour; this promotes externally imposed discipline rather than self-discipline and principle-based behaviour;

• where power and authority are not typically shared; considerable time is wasted seeking authority higher up the chain of command. This frustrates managers and employees and negatively impacts on their abilities to get the job done;

• where corrupt behaviour is accepted;

• where misuse of vehicles and equipment is commonplace;

• where secondary employment is accepted as taking precedence over JCF work.

4.1.1 Subcultures

Many organisations, which are highly segmented and where there are distinct specialisms, lend themselves to the development of ‘subcultures’. Subcultures tend to develop around small groups of people within an organisation who work closely together and who share the same backgrounds, skills or beliefs. Often they develop where a certain group of people are treated differently within an organisation; leading to favour and perceptions of elitism. Subcultures can be very powerful and significantly influence the overall culture of an organisation. They are difficult to identify and even harder to break down; members may have strong self-interests and loyalties to their subculture group. Over time, these can be harmful to the overall integrity and effectiveness of an organisation. The JCF has strong subcultures that have grown up around a number of groupings and affiliations:

• Senior management, middle management and rank and file: each layer of the JCF has a different culture. The senior management is a cohesive whole, middle management similarly, and then the rank and file. This impacts on communications, power and authority structures, decision making and each layer’s perception of reality;

• Specialist units: the JCF has, historically, created a plethora of small specialist units
to tackle emerging problems. This has created closed elitist cultures where specialist unit members consider themselves to be above the rest of the JCF and have an expectation of special treatment. In these cases, there is a particular risk of loyalty being to the ‘team’ rather than to the organisation, and the potential for ethical, moral or legal boundaries to be violated in its interests;

- ‘Squad culture’: regardless of position, rank, location or situation, some staff will always respond to the needs of someone they were initially recruited and trained with, even if it means violating ethical, moral or legal boundaries;

- Civilian vs. police staff: despite an increasing number of civilian posts being created within the JCF over the last decade, a ‘them and us’ culture between police and civilian staff still remains. The two groups are not fully integrated and are treated differently, leading to potential jealousies and perceptions of superiority/inferiority.

4.2 Making a change

The culture of the JCF is severely hindering its effectiveness. It has clearly developed and become deeply entrenched over a period of years. It will not change quickly and it will not change simply because we and JCF staff are able to identify what is wrong. What is required is a concerted, long term and coordinated effort on the part of the Commissioner of Police and his managers and employees, supported by oversight bodies, including the MNS and the Police Services Commission (PSC), to tackle the negative aspects of the current culture on a number of different levels. Staff behaviour, beliefs, attitudes and their ways of working must all be changed through a range of targeted interventions focused on different aspects of the JCF’s performance and operation. These interventions must be targeted at where they will have maximum impact and at the right time.

Previous reform efforts have not specifically focused on addressing cultural issues, preferring to focus instead on more tangible changes to systems and processes. But as has been mentioned in Section 3, these reform efforts have not been fully successful and the JCF has not moved sufficiently towards modern policing as a result. As a consequence, tackling the culture head-on must be made a central theme of this transformation. In an organisation less at risk, the panel may have suggested that a cultural audit be undertaken as an early step in implementation. However, we are concerned that it would take precious energies away from addressing core issues that we know are impacting severely on the organisation, its relations with the public and others.

One of the key areas paramount to reforming the JCF culture is already taking hold; the anti-corruption strategy is being implemented, sending a clear signal that corruption will not be tolerated in the ranks. Transforming the culture will take coordinated effort on many fronts; focus is required on such areas as leadership, management and accountability along with promotion, learning and development, compensation and discipline, and integrating them so they better align with the culture and ethos of an effective community-oriented policing organisation. More precisely, what is required is:

- transformational leadership on the part of the Commissioner of Police;

- clarification of the role and membership of the JCF ‘senior executive team’ that is communicated throughout the organisation;
clarification of the role and responsibilities of the ‘senior executive team’, area commanders and divisional commanders to ensure that each is performing their role effectively;

a clear vision, mission and objectives for the JCF and a comprehensive policing plan against which the Force and its leadership can be held accountable;

linked to this, implementation of an effective performance-management system against which staff can be held accountable; including clarifying job descriptions, roles and responsibilities at lower levels of the organisation;

refocusing the style of leadership and management to assume a more citizen-centric and responsive approach;

the implementation of professional HR management and transparent HR processes;

an increase in overall compensation and the development of a new reward and recognition framework;

improvements to the working environment, including the JCF Police Academy and Staff College;

improvements to the training curriculum offered, especially leadership and management training for supervisory positions;

improved communication across the force, including opportunities for two-way communication and feedback;

enforcement of the JCF discipline code;

implementation of a revised personnel security vetting system, including an increase in the use of the polygraph test.

These recommendations are dealt with in more detail in the subsequent chapters of this report.

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1. **Changing the culture of the organisation should form a central theme of the transformation.**

2. **Since organisational culture is often not well understood, senior officers and managers should receive training in organisational culture and its implications for leadership; this should be subsequently incorporated into leadership and management training offered at the Staff College.**

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4.2.1 **Signalling a change to the culture**

The security situation in Jamaica and relative threat against the police has led the JCF to adopt methods of policing that have separated them from the community. As a consequence, the JCF style and mode of operation has remained somewhat militaristic and is out of step with modern policing. The JCF has been slow to adopt a culture of public service, community-based policing and respect for human rights. The present culture is
visibly also reflected in its name, uniforms and symbols.

An early step in signalling the seriousness of the intention to reform the police and to leave behind those elements of the culture that no longer serve a purpose, changes to these symbols of the past are important. What is required is a clear indication that there has been a positive shift in the way the JCF goes about its business; that it is, in effect, a new organisation with new leadership and management, new approaches to policing and a very different ethos to that of the past. To achieve this, we recommend that the name of the JCF be changed from the Jamaica Constabulary Force to the Jamaica Police Service. This reflects a more modern nomenclature and represents a break from the past. The uniform and symbols should be redesigned to reflect the ethos and requirements of a more modern, customer-oriented police service.

Since such proposed changes may cause disquiet among some JCF staff and veterans who are proud of the JCF heritage, it is important that such changes be handled sensitively, with clear communication over the reason for the change. Employees at all levels, the Police Officers’ Association and the Police Federation, as well as veterans should be given a chance to comment. It would also be in the interests of the reform that JCF staff and the public are actively engaged and consulted on such areas as a new design for uniform or other symbols. This, in itself, would signal a new way of engaging key stakeholders; failure to do so risks the proposal being met with resistance or even industrial action on the part of the police.

3. The name of the JCF should be changed to the Jamaica Police Service.

4. The police uniform and symbols should be redesigned to reflect the ethos and requirements of a more modern, customer-oriented police service.

5. Decisions on the redesign of uniforms and other symbols should be done in consultation with JCF staff, the Police Officers’ Association, the Police Federation and the public.
5. Tackling corruption

A police service within a democracy is best able to carry out its functions when the membership of the organisation enjoys the respect and confidence of the population it serves. Regrettably, over recent years, the JCF has progressively lost public support due, in part, to the actions and attitudes (and at times corrupt behaviour) of some of its members. Of significant concern is the number of JCF staff who either fail to adhere to the rules and regulations governing the order and discipline of the Force or, more significantly, those who engage in a range of illegal activities or activities that put them in direct conflict with citizens, such as engagement in secondary employment.

Compounding these perceptions, there are those who have been caught, or continue to be actively engaged in criminal activities, but who are allowed to remain part of the Force. As recently indicated by the commissioner, in his foreword to the JCF Anti-Corruption Strategy, it is now true to say that the people of Jamaica believe that corruption is endemic and institutionalised in the JCF and that the majority of senior officers are corrupt or tolerant of corruption. This lies at the heart of public mistrust of the Force and detracts from the hard work of honest and professional members of the JCF. The corrupt practices that have become endemic include:

- contract killings and torture;
- engaging in or with criminal organisations;
- extortion;
- perjury;
- alerting criminals of JCF plans for interdiction;
- failing to attend court as a witness;
- planting evidence or removing it from crime scenes;
- tampering with exhibits;
- trafficking in weapons;
- theft, including seizures made by police (e.g. narcotics);
- sale of favourable inspection reports for bars, clubs, etc.;
- dropping of charges, including for serious offences;
- pay-offs for road traffic offences.

Policing, by its nature, provides opportunities for corruption and unprofessional behaviour. The desire to engage in such activities is based mainly on greed, which is a trait of all societies, although in the case of the JCF, some of the activities may be based on perceived necessity. As set out in Section 8, the level of JCF compensation is significantly low, given the nature of their duties and levels of responsibility. This encourages some members of the Force to seek alternative means of supplementing their incomes and can lead them to engage in illegal activities or otherwise make them vulnerable to those who seek to corrupt them. This is not to suggest there is an excuse for illegal behaviour on the part of the JCF. But it is critical to understand some of the drivers for this behaviour in order to take decisive action. As set out in the JCF Anti-Corruption Strategy, the challenge facing the JCF is how

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2 Commissioner of Police: Working Together for a Valued and Trusted JCF
to make the JCF more resistant to temptation and intolerant of unlawful, unethical and unprofessional behaviour.

The JCF has recently taken decisive action to tackle corruption. In 2007, it appointed an international police officer to the position of ACP Anti-Corruption. In late 2007, the force published its first anti-corruption plan. We are impressed with the governance structure in place to ensure the anti-corruption strategy is fully implemented and that the message that corruption will not be tolerated is communicated inside and outside of the force. On a cautionary note, international experience, as emphasised by Interpol’s anti-corruption efforts, is that a permanent yet flexible strategy is required. Given the endemic nature of corruption in the force, it will take many years for it to be eradicated, but the implementation of the anti-corruption plan presents an excellent start that must be built upon and developed so that integrity and anti-corruption become embedded as philosophies across the Force.

The action of the JCF is being supplemented by action on the part of the GoJ and the Ministries of National Security and Justice. The Ministry of Justice is establishing a Special Prosecutors’ Office to deal with corruption cases in the JCF and across Government. This is in direct response to public criticism that corruption cases are not brought to court or take a long time to be completed. In addition, to ensure independent investigation of corruption cases, the Government is establishing the Independent Commission for Investigation (ICI). This organisation will be charged with the investigation of all complaints against the security forces, including those of corruption. It will work closely with the Special Prosecutors’ Office. It is likely that in due course the remit of the ICI will be extended to include investigation of complaints and corruption across the public service.

5.1 Personnel security vetting

Extraordinary circumstances call for extraordinary measures. There can be no greater risk area for security in Jamaica than is posed if personnel security within the ranks of its police service is not assured. We believe all Jamaicans will understand that this is paramount to successful reform.

The JCF’s security vetting system is currently not in line with international standards and practices. It is critical for the JCF that its vetting arrangements are brought up to date:

- as a key tool in ensuring a corruption-free organisation;
- to guarantee to CARICOM and other international partners that its working practices are secure and that it can be trusted with sensitive information.

The MNS reviewed its vetting policy in 2007 and will shortly be rolling out a new system across the ministry. This should provide a working basis for the JCF system so that it can be brought up to date and applied quickly.

However, we believe that security vetting is an essential precursor to launching other fundamental aspects of the reforms proposed in this report. An overall vetting review is likely to take some time to impact the integrity of the organisation. The seriousness of the situation is such that we do not believe there is time to wait. If the reforms are to be successful, the JCF must demonstrate its intention to be corruption free from the very outset of the reform process, and no more so than at the very top of the organisation. To this end,
we believe that an urgent and incisive measure is necessary.

We believe that the GoJ should undertake an immediate extraordinary security vetting exercise to ensure the integrity of all staff who will be employed in the JCF going forward. Given the timescale, and that it is the JCF itself that is being vetted, it will not be possible to complete the usual JCF field checks normally employed in other vetting exercises. Instead, we propose a two-stage approach that together we believe will provide an appropriate level of cover:

- completion of the ministry-approved Personnel Security Vetting Forms developed for the ministry’s revised security vetting policy, which includes a signed declaration that information provided is truthful;
- use of polygraph testing.

The proposed approach will begin at the very top of the JCF and cascade through the organization, layer by layer:

- at the senior executive level (commissioner, DCP and ACP), 100% participation would be mandatory. At this level, all staff, and their administrative and other support, will be required to complete the relevant vetting forms and undergo polygraph testing;

- at the middle-management level (all superintendent ranks), all staff in identified sensitive positions will complete the relevant vetting forms and undergo polygraph testing. A further 25% random sample of the middle-management group and their administrative and other support will also be vetted;

- at the level of inspector and below, all staff in identified sensitive positions will complete the relevant vetting forms and undergo polygraph testing. Other staff will be vetted on a random basis.

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**Percentage Vetted**

- **DCP, ACP**
  - 100% incl immediate staff

- **Supt**
  - 20-25% at random, plus key

**Impact**

- Cascading ensures those in key positions are more likely to be vetted
- Reinforces zero tolerance to corruption
- Those engaged in corrupt behaviour either:
The reasoning behind this differentiated approach is that it is paramount the top of the JCF be guaranteed corruption-free. This, combined with a random sample based vetting at the middle-management level, will serve to send a clear and direct message that corruption will not be tolerated. Those not vetted as part of the extraordinary exercise will be "under notice" as to what is valued, and that there will be dire consequences for anyone caught involved in corrupt behaviour. As with the lower levels of the organisation, once employees see the new direction and resolve, some employees will either 'self-select' out of the JCF, modify their behaviour, or be at increased risk of detection, since the cultural norm will, in the short to medium term, begin to shift towards a greater openness to identify wrongdoing amongst peers. In fact, based on recent successes by the Anti-Corruption Branch, there may already be a trend towards more openness both within and outside of the JCF.

In due course, all staff in the JCF will be vetted under arrangements to implement a revised security vetting policy across the JCF. This should involve the introduction of a five (5) year review process to ensure that the vetting status of all staff is reviewed on a regular basis and their integrity and commitment reconfirmed.

A 'one-time' infusion of effort and resources -- ideally to be drawn from the international police community -- will be required to complete the extraordinary vetting exercise in the short timeframe demanded by the seriousness of the situation. Volume, time constraints and the very nature of the requirement are such that internal resources should not be considered.

The immediate vetting exercise in the manner outlined above will send three clear and unequivocal messages to three key audiences:

- first, to those who have or seek to engage in corrupt behaviour, that the zero-tolerance policy is being implemented with certainty and swiftness;
- second, to those employees at all levels who serve with pride and integrity, that the
period of prolonged reform is finally here and that they can have hope and re-engage in the transformation without fear of retribution;

- third, to the people of Jamaica and all others who visit or conduct business on this island, that the Government and Commissioner of Police are committed to reform.

In addition, the panel recommends that each member of the JCF renews their oath of office as a signal of their commitment to the culture and ethos of the new organisation.

| 6. | The JCF should promulgate a zero-tolerance policy towards corruption. |
| 7. | The commissioner's zero-tolerance policy towards corruption should be increasingly communicated across the force and to the general public. |
| 8. | The JCF anti-corruption policy should be fully implemented with sufficient funds provided for its implementation by the GoJ. |
| 9. | The JCF should review and update its personnel security vetting policy. This should include developing a policy and implementation of arrangements for automatic polygraph testing of the senior executive team and staff in identified sensitive positions across the force. |
| 10. | As an immediate measure to assure a corruption-free environment and enable broader reforms, an extraordinary security vetting exercise should be carried out so that all staff meet the security vetting criteria set out for their positions. |
| 11. | Steps should be taken to develop a secondary employment and a conflict of interest policy; the oversight bodies discussed in Section 6 should have responsibility for monitoring these policies. |
| 12. | Each member of the JCF should renew their oath of office as a commitment to the culture and ethos of the new organisation. |
6. Building an accountability framework

Effective policing in a democratic society must be based on the consent of the community; the community recognises that the need for policing grants the police the authority to carry out their duties and actively supports it in doing so. However, this relationship cannot be unconditional; the police must be accountable to the community and the community must have the means to ensure that it gets the best policing service and value for money. The police are also subject to the law, just as other citizens are subject to the law, and there must be mechanisms in place to ensure that this is respected.

Internally, the police can be held to account by systems and procedures including: management and supervisory oversight; policing plans and the monitoring of performance against plans; a robust performance appraisal system; audit and inspection; and the internal discipline system. Externally, the police can be held accountable in a further number of ways:

- through the community being able to ask questions about what the police are doing and why;
- by being held to account if they break the law;
- by being externally audited to monitor quality of service delivery and value for money.

All of these aspects must be addressed if full accountability is to be achieved and if policing is to be considered effective, efficient, fair and impartial3.

The JCF lacks many of these internal and external mechanisms or, where they do exist, they are not yet necessarily effective. As outlined in the previous section, the JCF lacks the effective leadership, management and structural arrangements that support meaningful accountability. In this section, we examine other internal and external accountability mechanisms available to the JCF and make recommendations as to how they can be improved.

6.1 Internal accountability

The JCF’s internal accountability framework is weak. Further to management and structural deficiencies, the JCF lacks detailed plans, with objectives and targets, and data against which it can assess its performance and be held to account for its achievements. Similarly, there is no effective performance appraisal system against which individual members of the force can be held to account. While there is a legislative and regulatory framework governing the activities of the force, these require updating and streamlining. The espoused values of the JCF are not integral to the culture and, while an acceptable disciplinary code and procedures exists, the JCF does not work effectively with the PSC to manage potential breaches. In essence, the internal accountability mechanisms in the JCF are not functioning as they should and significant effort is required to establish an internal accountability framework against which the force can hold its members to account.

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3 Patten Report: A New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland
6.1.1 Planning and performance management

Policing plans help police organisations to think ahead, identify priorities, allocate resources efficiently and monitor progress against agreed timetabled targets. In environments with limited resources, planning and performance management are even more important as they help to allocate and manage the available resources to achieve maximum impact. Although the JCF’s Corporate Strategy sets out the vision for reform, the JCF does not have a corresponding, comprehensive, detailed policing plan which sets out how that vision will be delivered, together with objectives and targets and, most importantly, a mechanism for establishing progress against those targets. Divisional commanders have been assisted under the JCFRMP to develop divisional policing plans. However, these plans are not anchored in any broader, overarching plan for the Force as a whole and, therefore, do not necessarily accurately reflect overall objectives and priorities. While focusing on plans from the ‘bottom up’ will bring the JCF leadership in closer touch with the problems facing citizens, it also risks the JCF being driven by local operational priorities rather than strategic issues.

Linked to the absence of a policing plan is the absence of a comprehensive system to monitor and manage the performance of the JCF. There is no comprehensive performance management framework that routinely collects data against performance indicators and targets set out in policing plans to establish whether the objectives and priorities of the force have been achieved.

The MNS has recently reformed its corporate and operational planning system and moved to a three-year budgeting cycle. Each of its divisions, department and agencies is now required to prepare a three-year corporate plan and an annual operational plan which are submitted to the ministry for alignment with its overall corporate plan and annual operational plan. Performance against these division, department and agency plans is reviewed by the ministry on a half-yearly basis to ensure that key objectives and priorities are being met. While the senior management of the JCF has participated in the monthly meetings that underpin this process and submitted a half yearly review for the first time in 2007, it has yet to produce a three-year or annual policing plan and, in this respect, lags behind its counterpart departments and agencies.

The development of an effective policing plan and performance monitoring framework for the JCF will ensure that:

- there is a satisfactory mechanism whereby the service can be held accountable for its performance or achievement of key GoJ security policy objectives;
- greater attention is given to strategy and long-term planning;
- strategic, financial and tactical decisions are better informed by performance data and information;
- individual efforts are better aligned to organisational objectives and employees at all levels are clear regarding how their work impacts on overall JCF performance;
- promotion and reward align with organisational objectives.

It is critical that the JCF reviews its current HR arrangements and in particular relaunches the concept of performance appraisal across the force. Until an effective planning and
performance framework is in place, JCF managers cannot hold their staff to account and the JCF cannot be held to account for its overall performance.

The JCF should develop policing priorities over a three (3)-year horizon and embed these in a three (3)-year strategic plan. This should be supported by annual operational policing plans that include objectives, performance indicators and targets for the whole force. In turn, these JCF plans should be supported by corresponding annual plans for each division and specialist area (such as Community Policing, Crime Prevention, Crime and Intelligence and Operations). Each divisional or specialist plan should also contain clear objectives, performance indicators and targets that reflect the overarching priorities set out in the JCF plans. In due course, the priorities of divisional and specialist plans should be cascaded and interpreted at the individual level through an effective performance appraisal system (see Section 6.1.2).

Elsewhere in this report (see below), we have recommended that the JCF collaborate with a newly expanded PSC which should assume the role of the PCOA for oversight of JCF performance. In this context, the JCF and the PSC would jointly draw up a three-year and annual policing plans. These would be submitted to the ministry by the PSC which would also take responsibility for holding the JCF to account for achievement of the agreed objectives and targets and reporting to the minister and ministry on JCF performance.

13. A clear set of policing priorities over a three (3)-year horizon should be developed and embedded in a three (3)-year policing plan and annual policing plans that include objectives, performance indicators and targets for the whole force.

14. The JCF’s overarching policing plan should be supported by corresponding divisional plans for each geographic division and plans for specialist areas such as Community Policing, Crime Prevention, Crime and Intelligence and Operations.

15. Each divisional or specialist plan should also contain clear objectives, performance indicators and targets that reflect the overarching priorities set out in the JCF policing plan.

16. In due course, the priorities of Divisional and specialist plans should be cascaded and interpreted at the individual level through an effective performance appraisal system.

6.1.2 Performance appraisal

A robust planning and performance management programme ensures that an organisation aligns the efforts of its employees towards achieving its objectives; that each manager, supervisor and employee understands exactly what is expected of them; and that they have performance objectives and targets commensurate with the authority and resources of their position. While a performance appraisal policy and system exists at individual level in the JCF, there is little evidence that it is employed with any consistency.

A limited focus on individual-level performance will undermine the overall impact of any planning and performance framework established for the force as a whole. It is important that the JCF revisits its arrangements for performance appraisal and implements a workable
system for monitoring performance and holding individual staff members to account. Any appraisal system must clearly be linked to the overall JCF planning and performance system so that force objectives are cascaded down and interpreted at the individual level.

The MNS is in the process of implementing the Performance Management and Appraisal System (PMAS) that is being rolled out across GoJ and which links performance to pay, the other rewards, promotion and career development. At this stage, it is not recommended that the JCF adopt PMAS as it is considered too complicated for its immediate needs. Instead, the JCF should adopt a simple process that can be easily administered until such time as managers and staff are more familiar with the process and a performance culture more commonplace within the organisation. In the meantime, however, the JCF should consult with the MNS PMAS team to learn lessons from the PMAS implementation.

During year one of implementation, it is recommended that the JCF implement an interim performance and reward arrangement. This would involve setting a small number (perhaps three) of simple and achievable objectives, for each staff member the achievement of which would be subject to review. Linked to the achievement of these objectives would be financial and non-financial rewards. In this way, the JCF can begin to develop a results-oriented culture and raise awareness of performance issues, while also accomplishing a variety of key objectives and targets.

| 17. | Current arrangements for performance appraisal in the JCF should be reviewed, revised as necessary and the concept of performance appraisal re-launched across the force. |
| 18. | As a minimum, the performance management system should include a performance agreement for Gazetted officers where each is required to commit to key deliverables at the start of the year against which they will be assessed at the end. Reward should be linked to achievement of these deliverables. |
| 19. | In year one of implementation, the JCF should implement a slimmed-down performance appraisal system linked to a simple reward framework. This should be superseded in year two by a formal and comprehensive performance appraisal system. |
| 20. | The JCF should consult with the MNS PMAS team to learn lessons from the ministry’s PMAS implementation to guide the development of a performance appraisal system for the JCF. |
| 21. | The performance appraisal system adopted by the JCF should be linked with the three-year and annual planning process for the force as a whole. |
| 22. | The JCF should implement arrangements for a professional HR unit and this unit should take responsibility for the management of an effective performance appraisal arrangement in the force. |
| 23. | A focus on respect for human rights should be included in all senior managers’ work plans under the performance management system. |
6.1.3 Inspection and audit

The administrative procedures and arrangements which relate to the JCF are contained in several pieces of legislation, including three main instruments or subsidiary legislation:

- the Book of Rules (1988);
- the Police Services Regulation (1961);

The latter is a compilation of the Book of Rules, the JCF Act and several Force Orders which have become, over time, the main pillars of the administrative arrangements of the JCF. The obligation on the JCF to adhere to these three main instruments creates a highly rule-bound formal governance regime that further impedes management and accountability. The different instruments are not in line with the requirements of a modern policing service and need to be revised and streamlined.

Under the current JCFRMP, significant effort was made by the JCF to establish an effective Professional Standards Branch (PSB) which, among other responsibilities, had responsibility for Inspection. In order to fulfill its mandate regarding the last of these responsibilities, the PSB established a Performance, Audit and Monitoring Branch (PAMB) with responsibility for monitoring the compliance of the JCF with its Act and administrative regulations and procedures. The PAMB has recently been disbanded by the new Commissioner of Police and an Office of the Inspector General (OIG) created within the Commissioner’s office. In addition to the OIG, the MNS has an internal audit team which has the authority to audit JCF compliance with rules and procedures and the ministry’s external audit team audits the financial accounts of the JCF Finance Branch.

The establishment of the OIG within the Commissioner’s office signals that he is taking the monitoring of JCF compliance with its Act and regulations very seriously. We applaud this initiative, since we believe an inspection function within the JCF to be a critical element of its accountability framework. However, it is important to recognize that the monitoring role of the OIG is very different to that of a unit monitoring overall JCF performance against objectives and targets. Both functions are required within the revised structure.

Below, at Section 6.2.2.5 we have recommended that the planned inspection function currently resident in the PCOA be scaled back to avoid overlap and duplication with the Office of the Inspector General. This does not mean, however, that we consider external audit irrelevant. Instead, we have recommended that the PCOA’s inspection functions operate at a more strategic level, monitoring JCF performance and carrying out periodic thematic inspections of specific areas of performance.

It is critical to note, however, that over time the organisation needs to become less driven by rules and more driven by performance and values. At such time, the panel would expect the Acts, rule books and regulations to have a less prominent position within day-to-day management arrangements, performance and delivery of results. This does not mean that the JCF would not be subject to legislation and clear standard operating procedures but rather managers would have the flexibility to manage staff according to circumstances within
24. The JCF Act, the Book of Rules (1988), the Police Service Regulations (1961), and the JCF Manual of Force Standing Orders, Volume 1 should be revised and streamlined to bring them into line with the needs of a modern policing service.

25. The inspection functions currently resident with the PCOA should operate at a more strategic level, monitoring JCF performance and carrying out periodic thematic inspections of specific areas of performance.

### 6.1.4 Discipline

Because of the unique powers of the police, the public expects a higher degree of accountability from police organisations and individual officers. The actions of police staff can have life altering consequences for the public and unauthorised actions can have legal consequences for staff, the police service and the Government. Consequently, ensuring that police officers act in accordance with law, operational policy, rules and training is an indispensable element of effective modern police management. It is, therefore, imperative that there is a system of discipline to ensure that police staff do not breach the terms and conditions under which they are asked to perform their duties. At the same time, that system must be fair, swift and just.

In employment, generally, and police work, in particular, the notion of fairness in the administration of discipline plays a key role. If police staff believe that they are going to be dealt with fairly, they are more likely to be accepting of disciplinary action and less likely to shield any breaches. In contrast, when discipline is viewed as unfair or unpredictable, employees often try to undermine or avoid the process and develop negative attitudes towards the organisation. Unfair disciplinary processes (and those perceived as unfair) support the development of a "code of silence" among employees and undermine the legitimacy of the disciplinary process.

The JCF is a 'rule-rich' organisation with regulations that cover almost every facet of operations. A cursory examination of the Police Service Regulations (1961) and the Police Book of Rules highlights the fact that the lack of discipline in the force is not as a result of inadequate regulations but rather the lack of proper management and enforcement. As participants at one of the public consultations noted, "if the JCF were even following one half of the rules it has, the organisation would have been well ahead in terms of effectiveness".

There is a division of responsibility for discipline between the Commissioner of Police and the PSC. Chapter 13 of the JCF Manual of Force Standing Orders, Volume 185, sets out the parameters for disciplinary authority and procedures. The Standing Order makes it clear that the JCF Act provides for a chain of command whereby members are supervised through the seniority of rank and, therefore, the responsibility to maintain discipline follows the rank structure. However, by virtue of the Public Service Regulations (1961), the PSC has responsibility for the discipline of officers and inspectors, whereby this function has been delegated by the PSC to the Commissioner of Police in respect of the rank and file. The Public Service Regulations (1961) further empower divisional officers, acting as authorised persons, to conduct summary trials (called Orderly Rooms) for minor offences, particularly where the offences do not raise the issue of dismissal. Provision is also made for the establishment of Courts of Enquiry to deal with rank-and-file members.
Data made available to us during the review indicate that there is a significant backlog of cases at all levels – some 500 – many of which date back eight (8) years. Of these, many of the staff affected are suspended from duty. Some reasons offered for this backlog include:

- insufficient evidence to bring cases to Orderly Rooms, Courts of Enquiry or the regular courts;
- transfer of staff between posts which impede the development of cases and create difficulties in terms of in which jurisdiction cases should be heard. Anecdotal evidence suggests that transfer is sometimes used on purpose by managers as a means of avoiding an Orderly Room or Court of Enquiry being called for staff;
- gaps in the chain of evidence and the lack of proper case files and reports.

In addition to the backlog of cases, we learned that the execution of Orderly Rooms and Courts of Inquiry is treated casually across the spectrum of the organisation. We also learned that there have been numerous instances where promotions have been granted for staff despite blemished records and outstanding disciplinary rulings. Despite the assembly of evidence and presentation of information to incriminate staff, the JCF has been less than diligent in submitting files to the Commissioner of Police, the PSC, and the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). In fact, the PSC reports that despite the hundreds of cases of police breaches over the last four years, only four files have been received from the Commissioner of Police requesting the PSC to advance disciplinary sanctions. This raises serious concerns.

While it is important to ensure that there is a fair and just system in place for staff who commit breaches of the disciplinary code, a system that is ineffectually managed, and frequently and visibly circumvented by the JCF, is of little value. Failure to swiftly and decisively hold staff to account for abuses and other inappropriate behaviour not only compromises the integrity of the force but hits at the heart of public confidence and trust in the police. The National Crime Victimization Survey (2006) shows that “satisfaction with police performance was quite low.” The report highlighted that “almost half of the respondents were either ‘not very satisfied’ with the police (14.2%) or “not satisfied at all” (32.5%). This was echoed in the public consultations where the public complained of a lack of trust in the police and indicated that this was, in part, caused by a lack of effective disciplinary procedures and sanctions against members of the force who breached procedures or the law.

While the existing procedures for discipline appear to be complex and unwieldy, we believe that the current regulatory provisions are adequate to allow for an efficient and just disciplinary system. However, significant attention needs to be given to the operation of the system within and by the JCF before it can be considered as an effective accountability mechanism.

The JCF, in a bid to address the obvious weakness in the system, undertook a review of the disciplinary process in 2006. This report made a number of recommendations as to how the process could be made more timely and efficient, including: using retired JCF senior staff to convene Courts of Enquiry; a formal process for reviewing files to ensure there is a prima facie case to be tried; time limits for acting on case files; modifying regulations to allow cases for JCF, ISCF and district constables jointly; changing sanctions to include development as well as punitive action; the introduction of plea bargaining and
implementation of an awareness-raising programme regarding discipline across the force.

The review of 2006 was based on the premise that the current command and control-type approach to discipline would be retained and therefore, valid recommendations were made regarding how the system could be improved. Reforms to the discipline code in many other jurisdictions have moved away from the punishment-based approach to a more affirmative or remedial approach to discipline. Punishment in some instances is appropriate, but more modern models are worthy of consideration. An underlying premise to the affirmative discipline model is that more emphasis is placed on staff consciously supporting the need to accept and conform to the organisation’s standards of conduct in exchange for staying employed.

The modern approach focuses on prevention first, engendering professional standards into each employee, thereby reducing the incidence of police misconduct. Some of the means employed for this purpose include:

- a greater emphasis on professional standards and ethics during recruit training and field coaching;
- a strong service orientation (i.e. the public interest supersedes police interest);
- greater community involvement with the police as a matter of practice;
- improved supervision and management capabilities throughout the organisation;
- instilling a high level of pride in police craft and the organisation among staff at all levels.

It is our considered view that the disciplinary process could be better managed by the introduction of metropolitan and regional Courts of Enquiry. This would considerably speed up the process of hearing cases and allow for better and more consistent management and representation.

26. The GoJ should initiate a comprehensive review of the discipline system with a view to bringing it in line with modern policing practice, providing a greater emphasis on remedial action versus punishment.

In the interim:

27. A review and analysis of all outstanding breaches by JCF staff below the rank of inspector should be carried out and action taken as appropriate.

28. All outstanding cases of criminal breaches against Gazetted officers should be properly prepared and sent to the PSC immediately.

29. The backlog of some 500 outstanding disciplinary cases should be processed as a matter of urgency.

30. A permanent Court of Enquiry to deal with serious disciplinary matters should be established in Kingston serving the Corporate Area and Saint Catherine.

31. Regional Courts should be established in the western and central ends of the
32. Retired senior attorneys and retired judges should be asked to serve as presidents of Regional Courts.

33. Lawyers should be used to prosecute matters against members before the Court of Enquiry; police officers who are qualified as lawyers should also be trained to act as prosecutors in the Court of Enquiry.

6.2 External accountability

The issue of external oversight of the JCF has been the subject of much debate in Jamaica in recent years and much effort has been invested in building structures and mechanisms to be able to do this. In addition, the JCF’s focus on developing its community policing and community safety capacity has provided a greater opportunity for the public to engage with the police on the quality and nature of the services they provide. Nonetheless, how best to hold the JCF publicly to account remains a complex issue and efforts to date have not been altogether successful.

6.2.1 Public participation in accountability

Effective policing in a democracy is founded on the notion of community consent. A key principle is that the public interest takes precedent over the police interest. The community has an obvious stake in safety and security outcomes, confers its authority on the police to work towards these outcomes on its behalf, and assists the police in doing so. Since the arrangement is not unconditional, an appropriate accountability regime is necessary. Simply put, the police are the agents of the community to provide certain outcomes (safety and security). It follows then that the community requires a mechanism to ensure that those services are provided effectively and efficiently and within ethical and legal parameters. In a modern context, the police are not solely responsible for achieving these outcomes; these are everyone’s responsibility, notwithstanding that the police play a unique role in their achievement.

In the Jamaican context, there is a rich heritage of community participation and involvement in the delivery of public services and a wide network of community structures has been established to deepen the participation of citizens in helping to hold public bodies to account. However, this has not traditionally included the police as a natural partner in the resolution of community issues and the JCF has not fully bought into the concept.

Policing in and through partnerships is very uneven in Jamaica. In some areas, there is a well-developed philosophy of policing through partnerships and well-developed practices that realise this philosophy. This is especially so where partnerships are understood as involving “policing with the community”. This, however, is not a culture or a practice that is a characteristic feature of the Jamaican police. Where it does exist, it tends to exist because donor funds have been allocated to the police to develop pilot sites where the concept of policing with the community is embraced. However, even in these uneven domains, the police do not see themselves as equal partners. Rather, ‘partnerships’ tends to be used to mask something very different – namely police simply using ‘partners’ as information conduits for law enforcement rather than as a device for mobilising a wide range of knowledge and capacities that can enhance the goal of safety.
As noted above, the language of partnership tends to mask a very old and widespread practice within many police organisations. Partnerships are seen not as facilitating ‘policing with the community’ but rather as policing that draws upon community as a source of intelligence that can be used to promote more effective law enforcement. Partners are not seen as contributing directly to safety in their own right. Safety is seen as something that only the police can produce. This is a very limited concept of partnerships. Within this concept, the potential of partnerships as a source of effective cooperation that enables the police to act as one node within policing networks is lost.

In recent times, the JCF has been implementing community safety committees as part of its effort to implement a National Community Safety Policy. These committees are comprised of local community stakeholders and police personnel who work together to identify local crime and disorder problems and arrive at joint solutions. In addition, for a number of years the JCF has engaged in a number of outreach programmes with specific groups such as police youth clubs, consultative committees, crime prevention committees and the Youth Crime Watch with various levels of results. We believe it is commendable that the JCF is opening itself to public scrutiny and this is a step in the right direction.

These initiatives and the existence of networks of local community organisations across Jamaica provide a real opportunity for community partnership in deepening the democratic accountability of the JCF. However, the JCF must guard against any notion of ‘tokenism’ in its engagement with citizens and move aggressively to establish genuine mechanisms for incorporating local views in the design, implementation and evaluation of operational strategies. This requires that new opportunities are created for community groups to assist in determining policing priorities and share local information that can assist in measuring success or failure. This is important if the communities are to genuinely have a stake in the process and its outcomes.

The sustainability of these groups is critical. Very often, groups established for these purposes lack the institutional support mechanisms for maintaining them. As such, efforts should be made to strategically establish institutional arrangements with institutions such as the Social Development Commission and relevant non-governmental agencies that can assist in maintaining and monitoring these groups. Also, appropriate channels need to be created for ensuring that communities are able to find sufficient institutional recourse if they are not satisfied with the response, service or performance of the local police.

While the community safety committees and other groups established by the JCF are valuable in helping to advance local community safety, it is imperative that the JCF does not limit itself only to these. The issue of community safety affects all communities. Different communities have established different mediums through which they interpret and address local security issues. As a consequence, it is imperative that the JCF widens its engagement in a way that integrates other forms of existing community structures as well as community safety committees as part of the process of deepening accountability. Some of the other existing structures and mechanisms include the community development committees (CDCs) and parish development committees (PDCs). These structures are largely driven by governmental policy and are intended to facilitate public participation in the local and national development processes. These mechanisms, though still being developed and perfected, present numerous opportunities for the police to engage local citizens in developing a responsive police service on the ground.
34. The JCF should ensure that effective local-level mechanisms are in place to incorporate the views of citizens in determining local policing priorities and strategies.

35. The Community-Based Policing Model should further be developed and rolled out involving as many communities and their organisations as possible.

36. The JCF should strategically establish institutional arrangements and partnerships with institutions such as the Social Development Commission and relevant non-governmental agencies that can assist in sustaining and monitoring the participation of communities.

37. The PSC should ensure that the participation by the police in public partnerships is regularly audited as part of PSC and JCF inspection arrangements.

6.2.2 Formal oversight arrangements

There currently are three (3) formal bodies concerned with external accountability and oversight of the Jamaica Constabulary, in addition to the Ministry of National Security. These are the Police Service Commission, the Police Civilian Oversight Authority, and the Police Public Complaints Authority. While these organisations have responsibility for different aspects of JCF accountability, none holds the JCF effectively to account. This is of significant concern to the panel.

6.2.2.1 The Police Service Commission

The PSC is provided for in the Jamaican Constitution. Members of the Commission are appointed by the Governor General on the recommendation of the Prime Minister after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition. The PSC has authority to make recommendations to the Governor General with respect to:

- appointment and promotion of JCF staff at and above the rank of Inspector;
- retirement of JCF staff at and above the rank of Inspector;
- disciplinary proceedings and penalties against JCF staff at and above the rank of Inspector;
- appeals against any of the above for all ranks;
- selection of officers and staff for training courses and study leave.

The procedures under which the PSC operates are considered by the panel to be appropriate; however, the overall impact of the PSC is less than expected, given its powers. This appears to be largely due to a lack of adherence to operational procedures and cooperation on the part of the JCF, and not ineffectiveness on the part of the commission.

The PSC is reliant on recommendations from the commissioner to implement action in respect of promotions, discipline and training. Consequently, the Commissioner of Police
plays a key role in the effectiveness of the PSC. Latterly, this relationship has been inconsistent with referrals taking some time to reach the commission, if at all. This is most clearly illustrated in the areas of discipline: the PSC reports that there have been many instances where promotions have been granted by the JCF despite blemished records and outstanding disciplinary rulings. In addition, despite the assembly of evidence against a number of JCF staff, the Commissioner has not submitted disciplinary files to the PSC.

6.2.2.2 The Police Civilian Oversight Authority

The PCOA was established in 2006 as a mechanism, external to the JCF, to ensure accountability, adherence to policy guidelines and observance of proper policing standards by the force. The PCOA has a membership of seven. The chairman is appointed by the Governor General after consultation with the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition. Members serve for a term of five (5) years.

The main functions of the oversight authority are:

- monitoring the implementation of policy relating to the force and its auxiliaries;
- monitoring the performance of the force and its auxiliaries so as to ensure that internationally accepted standards of policing are maintained;
- conducting inspections of the force and its auxiliaries;
- monitoring the management and use of the financial and other resources of the force and its auxiliaries;
- performing such functions as may be necessary for promoting the efficiency of the force and its auxiliaries.

The PCOA is vested with generous powers to enable it to carry out its functions. It may:

- require the attendance of the commissioner or any other officer of the force or its auxiliaries;
- call for and examine any document and record;
- receive representations from members of the public in relation to the operation of the force and its auxiliaries;
- do all such other things it considers necessary or expedient for the purpose of carrying out its function.

The PCOA has the discretion to refer a matter to the Police Service Commission, the minister, the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption or the Commissioner of Police, where it considers it appropriate; it may also request that the entity take the appropriate action within its jurisdiction.

The PCOA has not been fully staffed or resourced since its inception and is largely still in an embryonic stage of development, particularly in relation to its inspection and audit function. Lack of resources and limited capacity have restricted its ability to impact significantly on the weaknesses of the JCF and no practical action has been taken as a result of inspection.
The PCOA expects that unless further resources are allocated to the organisation, there will be no change in its effectiveness over the next 12 months.

The Commissioner of Police reports to the Minister of National Security on policing matters, but is contracted following a selection process by the PSC. However, he is expected to account for his performance and that of the force to the PCOA. This has created ambiguity over who is ultimately responsible for holding the Commissioner and the JCF to account. In the recent past, the PCOA has not been able to establish policing priorities with the JCF or agree on a policing plan with the Commissioner. This situation calls into question the current division of responsibilities between the PSC and the PCOA and asks whether they are the most effective mechanism for ensuring police accountability.

6.2.2.3 The Police Public Complaints Authority

The PPCA was established in 1992 by the Police Public Complaints Act as an independent non-police entity to investigate allegations of misconduct filed by members of the public against members of the JCF and its auxiliaries. The authority consists of three persons appointed by the Governor General, one of whom is appointed executive chairman. Complaints may be made by an affected person or by any person on behalf of a person affected, with that person’s written consent. An important provision of the Act is that complaints may be made by any member of the public, whether or not that person is affected by the subject of the complaint. There is no time limit on when complaints can be made. The PPCA reports to the Minister of Justice. The functions of the PPCA are:

- to monitor the investigation by the JCF of any complaint or other matter to which the Act applies to ensure that the investigation is conducted impartially;
- to supervise the investigation of complaints by the JCF;
- to undertake direct investigation of complaints;
- to evaluate the system of complaints and report on this to the Minister of Justice from time to time.

Investigations are conducted by the authority’s investigative staff. Where the authority considers that a criminal offence may have been committed, the matter is reported to the Director of Public Prosecutions for his ruling; otherwise, it is reported to the Commissioner of Police with the authority’s recommendation.

In the fiscal year 2006/2007, the PPCA received 313 cases, plus 95 brought forward from the previous year. The authority completed 82% of direct investigations (334 of 408 cases). Rulings included 135 cases with criminal implications referred to the DPP; 160 cases with disciplinary implications submitted to the Commissioner of Police; while 78 cases were unsubstantiated. It also reviewed cases investigated by the Bureau of Special Investigation, BSI. The authority received 487 cases in addition to the 457 brought forward from the previous year (total 994 cases from the BSI); of this, 429 cases were completed. During the same period, 69% of cases referred by the JCF Complaints Division were appraised (cases received 213, plus 51 brought forward; cases appraised 183).

The PPCA does not have sufficient resources to carry out its functions effectively. It lacks also sufficient authority to compel members of the JCF to cooperate with investigations. The
PPCA uses police personnel to conduct its investigation which may be viewed as inappropriate by the public and raises potential conflict of interest issues.

6.2.2.4 The Ministry of National Security

Over the last few years, the relationship between the JCF and the MNS has been inconsistent. The ministry has lacked policy capacity and the JCF has operated without significant oversight from the ministry in terms of its performance implementing policy priorities. The MNS is currently strengthening its policy and planning capacity; a new corporate planning team and framework have been established and, by mid 2008, a new Policy Directorate will be in place. This Directorate will combine, for the first time, all policy functions within the ministry into one directorate that will take responsibility for the formulation, monitoring, evaluation and reappraisal of policy, as well as supporting the Ministry’s Departments and Agencies, including the JCF, in interpretation of policy. The Policy Directorate will:

- design and implement sound national security policies that have a positive and sustainable impact on security priorities;
- work collaboratively across the security and justice sectors to deliver coordinated responses to security threats and challenges;
- monitor and evaluate policy implementation and the performance of the ministry's departments and agencies to ensure they focus on priority policy issues, and that resources are being deployed as effectively as possible to gain the maximum impact in key problem areas.

In addition, the MNS has established a dedicated corporate planning team whose role is to develop corporate and annual plans for the ministry and monitor the performance of the ministry and its portfolio departments and agencies against planned objectives and targets. These two functions provide, for the first time, capacity within the Ministry to hold the JCF to account for delivery of strategic security policy priorities and objectives.

Essentially, the three critical areas of police oversight have been divided between four different organisations each mandated to play a distinct role in overseeing the operations of the JCF. As each element of accountability has become central to Government, a new organisation has been created rather than extending the capacities of exiting organisations that are already playing a similar function. Added to this is the role of the MNS and how its responsibility for the JCF fits together with that of the other three organisations; this is unclear to the JCF and the public. We consider the current arrangements to be inefficient and ineffective; they weaken overall accountability and create confusion for both the public and the police regarding who is ultimately responsible for holding the force to account.

6.2.2.5 Merging the PSC and the PCOA

We do not consider there to be merit in the separation of responsibilities between the PSC and the PCOA and recommend that the functions of the PCOA be merged with those of the PSC. This would create a single entity vested with the full range of functions commonly found in modern police management boards and authorities in other countries such as Canada and the UK. Under this new arrangement, the role of the PSC would be expanded and, in addition to its existing functions, it would assume responsibility for oversight of JCF performance and inspection/audit of its operations.
Merging the PCOA and the PSC would remove the ambiguity over whom the Commissioner of Police is accountable for his performance and create a single institution with the following functions:

- appointment of the commissioner;
- appointment of staff at and above the rank of senior superintendent (The current requirement for the PSC to decide on promotions at lower levels should be revisited);
- promotions;
- designation of staff for training and scholarships;
- discipline for staff above the rank of Inspector;
- holding the JCF to account for the services it provides to the public;
- assisting the JCF to plan and budget effectively;
- monitoring and improving JCF performance.

We have been informed that there is no legal impediment to the PSC assuming the responsibilities of the PCOA; while as a constitutional body, powers cannot be removed from the PSC without a constitutional amendment; powers may be added through subsidiary legislation.

38. The PCOA should be merged with the PSC to form a single oversight body.
39. There should be a periodic rotation of members in and out of the Police Service Commission to ensure its effectiveness over time.
40. That the PSC regulations be amended to reflect PSC responsibility for appointments for Gazetted officers only at and above the senior superintendent rank.

Currently, there is no strategic or annual policing plan, objectives or targets, agreed between the JCF, the PCOA and the MNS against which the JCF can be held accountable. The lack of policing plans and targets has made it almost impossible for the PCOA to carry out its performance monitoring and audit functions. The PSC should have responsibility for:

- agreeing, in collaboration with the Commissioner of Police and the MNS, to the policing priorities and objectives for the JCF over a three (3) year horizon;
- agreeing, in collaboration with the Commissioner of Police and the MNS, to a three-(3) year strategic policing plan and an annual policing plan;
- agreeing, as part of the above plans, performance targets against which the JCF will be held accountable;
- negotiating the annual policing budget with the MNS on behalf of the JCF;
• reviewing the performance of the JCF in collaboration with the MNS quarterly, including carrying out a formal review of performance against the annual and strategic plans on an annual basis;

• publishing an annual, publically available report on police performance;

• developing appropriate linkages with other areas of Government, the private sector, with NGOs and with the general public where the police need to collaborate or interact. This would build upon the PCOA’s existing outreach role, building solid police community relations and promoting understanding of the role of the JCF.

41. The PSC should assume PCOA functions for monitoring the performance of the JCF. This should include the establishment of a three (3)-year strategic plan, an annual police plan and a performance framework for monitoring JCF performance.

42. An appropriate staffing model for the newly expanded PSC should be developed as soon as possible and staffed as a priority.

The Executive Agencies Act allows for the provision of performance contracts between Agency CEOs and their parent ministry. These performance contracts set out the expected performance objectives and targets for the CEO based on the overall performance objectives and targets of the organisation. The performance contract then serves as an instrument against which the CEO can be held to account for the overall performance of the organisation he or she manages.

Given the difficulties that have been experienced in the past, holding the Commissioner of Police and the JCF to account, we consider that a similar approach for the JCF would be advantageous, and that a performance contract should be established between the Commissioner of Police and the PSC. This contract would act as the performance appraisal arrangements for the Commissioner of Police who would not be subject to the same performance appraisal arrangement as the rest of the JCF. The contract would be agreed and reviewed on an annual basis, and satisfactory performance against the contract linked to compensation and financial/non-financial incentives and rewards.

43. The PSC should establish a performance contract with the Commissioner of Police setting out objectives and targets against which the commissioner’s performance will be assessed on an annual basis. Satisfactory performance against the contract should be linked to compensation and reward.

The PCOA was intended to have an establishment of twenty three (23) staff; thirteen (13) of which have been approved with a request for an additional ten officers currently being considered. So far, only three (3) of the thirteen (13) staff have been recruited, and appropriate office space acquired. The additional ten (10) staff are intended to be involved in inspection and monitoring of the JCF. The panel considers the proposed arrangements for inspections and monitoring to be a duplication of functions with the OIG. The OIG will have responsibility for the day-to-day inspection of implementation of operational policies and standard operating procedures across the JCF and will report on their findings to the Commissioner of Police as part of the overall JCF performance management framework (see above). There is no requirement for the PSC to duplicate this type of detailed
inspection work. The newly established planning and performance reporting arrangements set out above will assist in developing a closer and more productive relationship between the PSC and the JCF in terms of managing its performance and the reports of the OIG can be shared as part of that process.

We do, however, acknowledge that there is a role for independent oversight and audit of the JCF and believe that the PSC should retain an audit capability. However, rather than duplicate the functions of the JCF, we recommend that the PSC adopts a more strategic role. Each year, linked to the review of the annual policing plan, the PSC audit team should carry out an annual audit of the JCF to assess its performance against objectives and targets. In addition, at other times of the year, the audit team should carry out ‘thematic’ inspections/audits focused on specific areas of JCF performance, e.g. use of force, promotion, management of equipment. In carrying out the thematic inspections, the PSC audit team should seek to act in partnership with the internal audit team from the MNS, other areas of Government and external consultancies for the provision of specific skills and expertise. This will avoid the need for expensive skills and expertise being kept ‘in house’ on a permanent basis when not required.

44. The PSC should retain an inspection/audit function. However, this should be at a strategic level and not duplicate the role and responsibilities of the Office of the Inspector General in the JCF.

45. The PSC inspection/audit function should focus on annual audits of police performance and thematic reviews of specific areas of operation, potentially in partnership with the Internal Audit team from the MNS, other areas of Government or external consultancies.

The Office of the Services Commissions is actively seeking to delegate its functions to Ministries under arrangements set out in the Public Service Regulations (1961) on the condition that they are competent in their management. In the same way, the PSC is able to delegate its responsibility for appointment, promotion, training and discipline to the JCF.

The JCF has intended for some time to create an effective civilian HR function to manage its HR matters – both police and civilian. As we set out in Section 8, this function has not yet been fully established. Clearly, there is no possibility that the HR functions of the PSC can be delegated to the JCF at this stage. However, at some stage in the future, once the JCF HR Unit has been established and is operating effectively, we believe that the PSC should delegate its HR responsibilities to the JCF. This would enhance the JCF’s ability to manage the recruitment, development and training of all staff throughout their careers and link discipline and performance more effectively than at present.

46. Once a productive working relationship has been established between the JCF and the PSC and the PSC, assesses the JCF as competent, it should delegate its HR functions to the JCF, including responsibility for appointment, promotion, training and discipline.

6.2.2.6 Relationship with the ministry

The MNS has a responsibility to account for the performance and expenditure of all elements of its portfolio, including the JCF. The PSC should not, and cannot, therefore,
work in isolation of the ministry. However, to maintain its independent oversight role, it will be important to delineate carefully the roles and responsibilities of each. To date, the roles and responsibilities between the JCF, the PCOA and the ministry have not been clearly defined and understood. The establishment of the PSC provides an unprecedented opportunity for all parties concerned to establish clear roles and responsibilities and generate mutually supportive working arrangements.

Based on experience from other countries which have similar police boards, the relationship between the PSC and the ministry should be as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MNS</th>
<th>PSC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Develops and sets policy framework</td>
<td>Interprets policy framework with JCF and agrees to policing priorities with the JCF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develops and agrees to ministry three-year corporate plan</td>
<td>Agrees to a three-year policing plan with the JCF Submits plan to the ministry for final approval and coordination with the ministry plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develops and agrees to ministry annual operational plan</td>
<td>Agrees with the JCF on an annual policing plan Submits plan to the ministry for final approval and coordination with the ministry plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develops and agrees to overall ministry budget</td>
<td>Agrees to an annual budget with the JCF Negotiates budget on behalf of the JCF with the ministry Negotiates with the ministry on behalf of the JCF over any requirement to reprioritise the budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submits JCF budget as part of MNS budget to Ministry of Finance and Public Service Negotiates with the PSC any requirement to reprioritise the JCF budget</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reviews overall ministry performance quarterly</td>
<td>Reviews JCF performance quarterly and sends a report to the ministry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reviews overall ministry performance annually</td>
<td>Reviews JCF performance annually and sends a report to the ministry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Produces an annual report for the MNS</td>
<td>Produces an annual report jointly with the JCF in coordination with the MNS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, the new policy directorate will work on a day-to-day basis with the JCF and the
PSC on specific aspects of policy development, modification or evaluation. In this role, it will act as a ‘critical friend’ to the JCF, assisting it to resolve policy-related, stakeholder and legislative issues which affect its ability to perform effectively.

The PSC’s constitutional responsibilities for appointment of the Commissioner, appointment of the officer corps, promotion, training and discipline should not be redefined as part of these arrangements.

If the PSC and the PCOA are merged, the Public Service Regulations should be reviewed and amended to establish the new relationship as described above between the PSC and the Ministry.

| 47. | The ministry and PSC should redefine their working relationship with regard to their relative responsibilities for planning, the oversight of expenditure and for holding the JCF to account for its performance. |
| 48. | The GoJ should review the Public Service Regulations relating to the PSC and amend as required to reflect the new relationship between and the MNS in relation to police performance and accountability. |

6.2.2.7 The future of the PPCA

For some time, the MNS and the Ministry of Justice have expressed concern regarding a general lack of integrity, increasing corruption and misuse of public funds across the public service. To tackle this issue, the Ministry of Justice is working to establish an Independent Commission for Investigations (ICI) that would take responsibility for investigating corruption and misconduct by members of the security forces, namely the JCF and the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF). The preparation of legislation for the ICI is well advanced and debate is ongoing over whether its remit should be expanded to encompass all public servants.

Given these initiatives, we consider it appropriate for the PPCA to be disbanded and merged with the ICI. The ICI will benefit from greater resources and improved capacities and neutral investigation arrangements, as well as bring further assurance of independence in the oversight process.

| 49. | The PPCA should be disbanded and its functions subsumed into the proposed Independent Commission for Investigations (ICI). |

6.2.3 Communication of performance results

Communication with the public and with the media is an area where the JCF has been traditionally weak. Efforts have been made to address this situation with some success through training and the expansion of the Constabulary Communications Network. However there is further work to be done to ensure that the JCF is able to get its message across and its staff can regain the trust of citizens. Critical to this will be the development of a culture of openness and transparency across the force as a whole and the sharing of information with citizens on the performance and challenges it faces. In this context, the operating assumption must be that the public interest takes precedence over the police interest. The JCF has reported publicly periodically on its performance against the corporate strategy but
has not, in recent times, automatically produced an annual public account of its performance. When public reports have been produced, they have lacked data against clear indicators and targets.

We consider that the JCF should, with the help of the PSC, produce each year an annual report of its performance. This should be developed by the Commissioner and his senior management team and submitted to the PSC for review before being forwarded to the Minister of National Security. At the same time, the PSC should prepare its report on its performance, and that of the JCF, which it should submit to Parliament. These documents should be completed following the PSC’s annual review of JCF performance and be linked directly to the achievement of the agreed objectives and targets set out in the JCF’s three-year and annual policing plans. These documents should be made publicly available. In due course, the Force should consider rolling out the concept of publicly available annual reports to the Divisions.

50. The JCF should prepare, with the assistance of the PSC, an annual report on its performance which should be made publicly available.

51. At the same time, the PSC should prepare an annual report on its performance and that of the JCF, which it should submit to Parliament.
7. A more effective leadership and management arrangement

While their particular operating contexts may differ, successful police organisations share common attributes in relation to leadership qualities and capabilities. It is important to note that leadership is a highly complex phenomenon that cannot be simply captured and communicated. With this in mind, it is important to understand that leadership in the modern police context is not the domain of any one individual – it is shared and distributed across all levels of an organisation. Effective contemporary police leaders:

- must first and foremost be authentic – what you see is what you get. Moral integrity and strong values are fundamental and must be demonstrably at the core of who they are and what they project;
- are able to understand the value of a shared vision and shared leadership;
- must focus on achieving results and breaking down unnecessary bureaucracy;
- can make incisive decisions when necessary, but intuitively know when it is important to consult with others;
- are able to engage both the hearts and minds of people in pursuit of excellence;
- are able to inspire others to new levels of commitment and contribution;
- can understand the value of teams and be able to create them effectively;
- are able to find ways to turn challenges and constraints into opportunities;
- care for and develop their staff;
- are effective communicators and can engage in dialogue with stakeholders and employees at all levels;
- are open to new ideas and knowledge;
- are self-aware. They understand and accept their relative strengths and weaknesses and build a management team that complements these;
- can organise for success.

The leadership of the JCF centres largely on the Commissioner of Police and the ‘High Command’. Traditionally, the High Command has included the Commissioner, deputy commissioners and all assistant commissioners. Power and decision making are vested in the hands of the Commissioner and the High Command and based largely on giving orders; the leadership style is described variously as risk adverse, authoritarian, hierarchical, highly centralised and ‘Commissioner–centric’. Over the last few years, the membership, role and responsibilities of the High Command have become less distinct as Commissioners of Police have chosen to make use of the High Command in different ways and limit the extent of the membership. This has created some uncertainty further down the organisation over where
authority for decision making lies.

The development of leadership skills has not been generally encouraged or fostered in the JCF. Junior, command and strategic command courses are offered at the Staff College, but officers have not been referred routinely to the courses and many staff in current leadership positions have not had formal leadership training as it has been some time since the last strategic command course. In addition, there has been inadequate focus on career management and succession planning for key leadership positions. This has, over time, limited the number of officers with the required leadership skills and qualities available to fill senior positions, and eroded the overall quality of leadership across the force. This is illustrated by the difficulties faced by the PSC on appointment of Commissioners of Police in recent years when there has been no obvious internal candidate to succeed the outgoing Commissioner.

The strategic deployment of international police officers (IPOs) at the senior levels of the organisation has been largely successful. They have brought much-needed skills and experiences to the police service. Over time, through the implementation of a sound human resources plan, the need for such external support will cease to exist. In the meantime, however, we recommend that the strategy continue, but that strong consideration is given to expanding the sourcing of IPOs beyond the United Kingdom to provide greater diversity to reform through the multinational perspectives this would enable.

The JCF has attempted to attract a higher calibre of recruit with leadership potential; in the mid 1990s it introduced a Graduate Entry Programme (GEP), to encourage university graduates to join the force by directly entering at the rank of Deputy Superintendent. This programme has never reached its potential. The panel considers the programme to have been a positive step towards developing leadership potential within the force, but it is clear that the programme needs to be re-energised.

The JCF is an organisation which is 'commanded' rather than managed. In some respects, this reliance on command and control is a product of the particular security situation in Jamaica which has distorted policing. We are not saying there is no place for command and control, but in modern progressive police organisations it is now relegated to less frequent occasions for which it is appropriate, such as large crisis-type operations, and is no longer commonly used in day-to-day management. Even if the security situation in Jamaica continues to be as much of a challenge as it has been in recent years, there still remains scope for considerable change in the management style of the JCF. This would significantly enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the organisation and be more in line with modern police services that are more rooted in the community, more accountable and more transparent.

The JCF is at a crossroads and facing a significant challenge; that of transforming itself into a modern policing service over a relatively short space of time, and while dealing with the significant crime and security challenges facing Jamaica. The dominant style of leadership and management is not conducive to leading the transformation and the setting of the organisation on a new course.

7.1 Management structure

An important aspect of a well led and managed organisation is how it is structured. When
looking at the current management arrangements in the JCF we adopted the following principles:

- that form should follow function;
- that over the next three to five years – a period of deep and significant reform in the organisation – it is critical that the Commissioner's span of control is narrow to enable him to focus significant personal energies on the reform;
- decisions should be made at the lowest point in the organisation closest to the client and at which the most data and relevant information exist to enable decisions on local policing to be made;
- as a general rule, the High Command should not be involved in day-to-day operations.

In this section of the report, the role and management arrangements between the High Command, Areas and Divisions are examined in turn.

7.1.1 High Command

The nomenclature ‘High Command’ reinforces the highly militaristic and hierarchical, top-down power structure that has existed in the JCF over time. The Commissioner and his executive team must be mindful of this and what such language conveys. More appropriately, we suggest that the Commissioner and his immediate group of senior executives should be referred to as: the Senior Executive Committee (SEC).

The effective governance of large, complex police organisations will always require careful management of the tension between the directional role (with its requirement for reflection and dialogue) and the management role (requiring incisive action and occasional involvement in operational matters). The Commissioner and his team must find the appropriate balance between directing and managing. Both are strategic and necessary to:

- consider trends and issues emerging at the global, national and regional levels;
- contribute to decisions affecting the future of policing and security in Jamaica;
- develop the direction for the Jamaica Constabulary Service;
- monitor the performance of senior managers;
- lead with wisdom, experience and insight;
- facilitate the growth of the entire organisation;
- interface effectively with Government, civil society and other policing organisations on strategic issues.

The Commissioner should also establish a larger body - the ‘senior management team’ – (SMT) that is widely consulted and involved in certain decision making, but whose membership is largely relied upon by the SEC to implement strategy.
This larger body would comprise the SEC members as well as all other ACPs and perhaps other key managerial functions such as HR or finance. This group would be widely consulted and involved in certain decision making. SMT members are those to whom the SEC would rely on to implement organisational direction and strategy.

Ensuring the sustainability of the leadership and management arrangements above will require a clear focus on leadership development and succession planning within the force. Key managerial and leadership positions must be identified and a programme drawn up for training and developing potential post-holders so that the force always has several people with the requisite skills and aptitudes who are able to assume a position should it become vacant. In this way, the leadership culture, quality of leadership and behaviours will be developed and sustained over time.

To support and enable the above executive leadership structures, an effective Secretariat function will be required. We believe that a formal Secretariat should be established in the Commissioner’s office to organise and coordinate the SEC and SMT functions. This would include responsibility for scheduling and coordinating meetings, preparing briefs and documentation, recording information and coordinating the execution of decisions.

7.1.2 Divisional primacy and Area command

The JCF divisional primacy philosophy is based on the assumption that local police are best placed to determine the most appropriate policing needs locally. Under this model, while operational policies and standards are developed centrally, responsibility for how they are implemented resides with divisional commanders. The assumption is that the divisional commanders are best positioned and should have the reasonable freedom to implement policies in a manner that are appropriate to local needs.

To ensure that divisional commanders are implementing the policies and procedures properly, the JCF will conduct regular evaluations, inspections and assessments of their performance. The philosophy of divisional primacy further informs the roles and responsibilities of areas and headquarters.

The roll-out of divisional primacy has been in various stages of implementation since 2005 with all 19 divisions now having responsibility for devolved decision making. While the JCF has run many training sessions and seminars on the subject of divisional primacy over the last three years, and all JCF staff should now be conversant with the principles, the philosophy has yet to take root within the organisation. For example, some divisional commanders still complain that some area commanders continue to interfere in divisional operations and that divisional primacy is very difficult to practise when resources are so scarce.

In the modern police service, divisional primacy also informs the functions of the area office and JCF headquarters. The modern headquarters is not involved in operations. Rather, it serves to support the Commissioner in establishing the direction for the organisation, ensuring appropriate external stakeholder relationships and ensuring the organisation is well led, managed and supported in achieving its objectives. The area office, in turn, should be refocused to be the geographic arm of headquarters in ensuring that organisational policies and directives are implemented as intended within the context of local realities and effective and integrated partnerships.
Our enquiries have pointed to a headquarters far too often involved in operational decision making that should more properly rest at the local level. This not only weakens the authority of area and divisional Commanders, but also creates frustration among divisional staff whose opportunity to demonstrate that they can manage effectively or show initiative is limited.

The command style of management in the JCF and the old attitudes this encourages prevent divisional commanders taking full control and accountability for policing matters in their divisions. In addition, divisional primacy depends in part for its success on having robust and reliable performance management and appraisal structures and processes in place, including mechanisms for issuing sanctions or rewarding success; these are weak within the JCF. Further effort is required on the part of the JCF leadership to clarify roles between area and divisional Commanders and embed divisional primacy.

| 52. | The Commissioner should clearly and publicly articulate the dominant leadership style which will be rewarded in the JCF. |
| 53. | Two key decision and problem-solving structures should be created: A senior executive committee and a senior management team, together with a secretariat to provide coordination and support (this should be drawn from existing resource allocations within the HQ). |
| 54. | A senior advisor should be appointed to work alongside the commissioner to support him in the implementation and development of sound internal government and management structure and arrangements. |
| 55. | A leadership training programme should be established, linked to career development and succession planning for key leadership and managerial posts across the JCF. |
| 56. | Divisional primacy should be further rolled out and embedded as a core element of JCF management arrangements; in this context, further effort is required on the part of the JCF leadership to clarify roles between area and divisional commanders. |

### 7.2 Internal communication

The importance of communications, particularly during a time of deep organisational change, cannot be overstated. It is central to the successful implementation of reform, particularly in today’s knowledge economy, in which employees and others have come to expect a high quality of communication. Furthermore, successful reform will be largely dependent on employees at all levels being willing to contribute, even if short-term personal sacrifices are necessary. In the absence of sound corporate messaging and communications, others will fill the void, often to the detriment of what the organisation is trying to achieve.

Effective communications must be timely, user-friendly, specific, informative and, most importantly, the message and means used to communicate it commensurate with the organisational values and culture. During times of transformational change, the reality is that ‘management is the message’. In other words, the most benign behaviours and actions of
leaders can eclipse more formal communications whenever there is incongruence between the two.

The backbone of communication in the JCF is the Written Directive System. This encompasses Force Orders, Circulars, Duty Hints, The Police Manual, The Book of Rules, the Police Gazette and Regulations. The Staff Orders form the main element of the system; the orders are a confidential and official document containing the orders and directives of the Commissioner of Police and are distributed to all police stations and units.

The Written Directive System is highly bureaucratic and follows the chain of command i.e. it is top down. There is little or no opportunity in the JCF for feedback or upwards communication. The hierarchical nature of internal communication in the force makes the system unpopular. The system is paper-based, which makes it extremely slow. Some directives can take up to three weeks to reach rural stations, which further weakens the overall impact of management arrangements and weakens accountability.

Outside of the Constabulary Communications Network (CCN), which deals with immediate communication needs with the community relating to incidents, the JCF has one civilian communication officer who is based in the Commissioner’s Office. The communications officer is mainly occupied with external communications and public relations. Little time and effort is spent on internal communications needs; this must change significantly in the context of reform.

The CCN mandate and approach to its function are also in need of review, based on our enquiries, which suggest the CCN may not be achieving the results expected in a community-oriented police service.

The current arrangements for communication within the JCF do not reflect the communication or management needs of a modern policing service and are a direct hindrance to the effective management of the force.

57. The JCF civilian communications team should be expanded to allow a greater focus on communication in addition to existing public relations activities. Additional staff also should be civilian.

58. Current internal communication arrangements should be rationalised and a comprehensive internal and external communications plan developed for the force.

59. The JCF should undertake a thorough review of the mandate and functions of the Constabulary Communications Network to ensure they are aligned with future requirements of the police service and the public it serves.

60. Mechanisms to facilitate two (2)-way communication between staff and senior managers should be implemented.

61. The implementation of an integrated IT system and the roll-out of e-mail to all staff, units and police stations should be fast-tracked to facilitate electronic communication.

62. The implementation of a force intranet should be fast-tracked to allow
management information and orders to be distributed electronically.

The JCF will not be able to deliver on its mandate without a well developed management infrastructure that can respond to the complex and evolving security environment.

7.3 Non-core functions of the JCF

We considered whether there were any functions within the JCF that were not directly compatible with its core functions and which could be divested to the private sector or managed through alternative, more-efficient arrangements. There are three areas that in our view warrant consideration:

- guarding and transport of prisoners;
- transport and repairs;
- Police Academy and Staff College.

7.3.1 Guarding and transport of prisoners

As was recognised in earlier reviews, a large number of fully trained police officers remain involved in prisoner guard and transport duties in and between courts, lock-ups and correctional institutions. These are not core police functions in most jurisdictions. With the organisation struggling to achieve full staffing of vacancies, the GoJ and the JCF can ill afford to have fully trained and experienced officers committed to these functions. These functions should be devolved to either the Correctional Services or divested to the private sector and the officers redeployed to core functions.

63. The responsibility for guarding courts and transporting prisoners to court and correctional institutions should be removed from the JCF and either transferred to the Correctional Services or divested to the private sector. The MNS should undertake a comprehensive study of prisoner transport to establish the most cost-efficient and effective option.

7.3.2 Transport and repairs

The Transport and Repairs Division (T&R) of the JCF is based in Kingston. Its role is to maintain and repair all JCF vehicles, procure spare parts/operate a centralised auto spare parts store, construct and repair items of furniture, office equipment, signs and upholstery and provide transport for police personnel on special duties. Transport and Repairs employs 23 police personnel and 200 civilians.

Transport and Repairs is responsible for the management of the JCF fleet, although this is delegated on a day-to-day basis to divisions. The KPMG/DFID review of 1998 suggested that the JCF consider leasing its fleet and contracting with the private sector for repairs as this would provide savings and better value for money. A cost-benefit analysis of this recommendation was not possible as part of this review, however, we believe this recommendation may have merit. The JCF faces continuing problems keeping a viable fleet
on the road. The Divisions in particular lack enough serviceable vehicles to meet their day-to-day needs. Transport and Repairs has requested the implementation of an electronic fleet management system to assist them in tracking and rotating vehicles, allowing them to be deployed where they are most needed and serviced on schedule. This, over time, should assist in the overall serviceability and number of vehicles available across the force.

We believe that that issue of fleet management should be revisited and a formal assessment of the cost benefit of the different options available for delivery of fleet services and repairs undertaken. If outsourcing is the preferred option, the JCF should maintain a small in-house capability to manage the servicing and repair of its covert holdings.

64. An independent assessment should be conducted to ascertain the cost benefit of different alternative service delivery options for the fleet service and repair programmes.

7.3.3 Police Academy and Staff College

The JCF’s Police Academy and Staff College are located at the same site, at Twickenham Park. The Police Academy’s role is to: recruit non-gazetted ranks, provide basic training and to facilitate academic training. The Staff College provides advanced training for JCF officers, junior and senior management, criminology and other career-related training. Both the Academy and the Staff College suffer from severe inadequacies in infrastructure and shortages of equipment such as training aids, computers and transport. This is affecting the ability of the force to attract and retain good recruits and staff, and deliver the quality of training the JCF requires to transform itself into a modern police service. Capital funds have been allocated in the 2008/9 budget to address some of the deficiencies of the Twickenham Park site but these fall short of what is required to bring the site up to standard.

We believe that given the severe infrastructure and resource constraints on the Police Academy and Staff College, the two entities should be merged into a single ‘police college’ and transformed into an executive agency. This would not only provide the opportunity for economies of scale but also enable the ‘police college’ to generate income through offering a range of law enforcement courses to a fee-paying local, regional and international customer base. Managing its own budget would give the new ‘police college’ greater control over the prioritisation and utilisation of its resources and the opportunity to cost courses and obtain revenue through an appropriate pricing strategy.

65. The Police Academy and Staff College should be merged into a single ‘police college’.

66. Once initial effort in support of the transformation of the JCF, as set out in this plan has been expended; the police college should be transformed into an executive agency.

7.4 Civilisation of core functions

Civilisation is a key instrument in the modernisation and professionalisation of police services. The overall objective of civilisation is not to reduce police numbers but, rather,
to ensure that police staff are employed on duties requiring their powers, experience and training. Over the last twenty years, the nature of roles performed by civilians has evolved considerably; at the outset, the majority of civilians filled administrative and technical functions. However, increasingly, civilians are filling professional functions within police services such as HR, finance and legal.

The KPMG/DFID review of 1998 recommended that a number of functions within the JCF that could be civilianised to allow skilled and trained police personnel to be released for other duties. This recommendation builds upon previous recommendations made in the Hirst Report in 1991 and the Hoodless Report in 1996. This was echoed in the PERF review of 2001.

The Immigration, Citizenship and Passport Services Division was civilianised and is now the Passport, Immigration and Citizenship Agency (PICA). However, in other areas of the JCF previously recommended for civilianisation, there remains trained police staff. This is a cause of significant concern, especially as there appears to be no clear reason why the civilianisation was not completed. Given the current security situation and constraints on JCF resources, it is imperative that all trained and able police personnel are deployed on policing duties and that roles that could be performed by civilian staff are civilianised as early as possible.

The JCF should immediately identify all current posts across the force that could be civilianised and initiate a further programme of civilianisation. In 2000, KPMG worked with the JCF to identify areas of the force that could be civilianised and a plan for completion of the task. This report may provide a useful starting point in the identification of areas suitable for civilianisation. As a minimum, the areas that have been previously identified in JCF reviews as suitable for civilianisation should be civilianised. These include: JCF Personnel Management; HQ stores; support staff in all general offices, and remaining police staff in the Police National Computer Centre.

67. The civilianization programme should be revised and reintroduced to the JCF as a key instrument of renewal and professionalisation. To facilitate this, a civilian position of director, corporate services should be established.

68. The JCF should identify all posts suitable for civilianisation and immediately initiate a programme of civilianisation. This should include as a minimum the areas that have been previously identified in JCF Reviews as suitable for civilianisation: JCF personnel management; HQ stores; and support staff in all general offices and residual staff in the Police National Computer Centre.

69. The proposed change oversight body (PROC) together with the new PSC should monitor the implementation of this programme.
8. Towards a more professional JCF

Most of the issues presented in this report are highly interconnected. Many of the solutions are complex and require an in-depth understanding of the JCF structures, systems, processes.

The establishment of the force is 10,000 but it currently operates under strength at approximately 8,347. The force can currently recruit and train up to 250 people per year. In 2007, approximately 250 staff left the force due to resignation, death, dismissal or retirement, meaning that the force is essentially ‘standing still’ in terms of recruiting up to its establishment. This problem will be compounded within the next five years when 43% of the current officers on staff are eligible to retire.

The JCF is facing a crisis in recruitment and retention of a competent and motivated workforce. The challenge of staffing up to establishment has been severely impacted by a range of negative aspects relating to the way the force manages the interests and well-being of its staff, namely:

- limited professional HR management, linked to training, development and career management;
- inadequate compensation;
- limited respect for work/life balance issues;
- workplace health and safety, relating particularly to working conditions, and limited vehicles and equipment;
- a training facility whose physical plant falls well short of that expected of a modern police recruit and in service training facility.

The combination of these factors does not provide any competitive advantage in attracting the type of recruit the JCF needs for the future. Overall, leadership and workplace conditions can lead new staff to become quickly disillusioned, with two consequences, both equally grave for the JCF:

- staff may seek alternative employment, thus reducing the workforce and negating the money and effort expended in training them to undertake complex police work;
- staff may become cynical, less committed and susceptible to negative influences and corruption.

In essence, the way the JCF is approaching the management and care of its staff is impacting negatively on its overall ability to create and maintain a balanced and ‘clean’ workforce. If the JCF is really to transform itself into a modern policing service, it is imperative that these issues be resolved. We understand that the current fiscal situation in Jamaica will make resolving some of these issues difficult. However, we sincerely believe these issues to be fundamental to the way ahead and that if not addressed the force will languish in its efforts to reform.
8.1 Professional HR management

The human resource management needs of police staff in the JCF are currently the responsibility of the personnel branch within the administration and support directorate. Essentially, the Personnel Branch administers personnel matters rather than actively managing the human resource needs of staff. The JCF is weak in all areas of HR management. There is currently no effective system for performance appraisal, a limited link between training, posting and career management and an absence of succession planning for key posts within the organisation. HR does not play a strong role in managing poor performance and discipline and there is no formal framework for managing health, safety and welfare issues.

There have been a number of recommendations made in previous reviews to develop a professional civilian HR function within the JCF and embed a more proactive approach to management of HR issues for both police and civilian staff. Accordingly, a review of its HR function was carried out by the JCF in 2001, a draft JCF Human Resources Strategy (2002-2005) drawn up with the JCF in 2002 and a civilian HR manager appointed in 2006. However, the civilian HR unit is currently understaffed; this has been the situation for over a year.

It is critical to its future effectiveness that HR management is seen as an important element of the overall JCF management strategy and a strategic partner in organisational decision making. A professional approach to HR management will be able to balance the needs of the organisation with those of its employees, in terms of their individual job satisfaction and satisfaction with the JCF as an employer.

The MNS should engage with the JCF and the Ministry of Finance and the Public Service to resolve the issues delaying the full staffing of the civilian JCF HR unit and ensure that all JCF HR-related functions are transferred under its management, including those currently under administration and support services. The civilian HR unit should take responsibility for:

- establishing and maintaining an HR strategy for the force;
- incorporating HR management into day-to-day management practices;
- establishing and maintaining up to date and effective HR policies and procedures to govern HR in the JCF; this should include the establishment and maintenance of a HR policies and procedures manual;
- managing for the JCF, implementation of all policies, procedures and activities relating to:
  - the application of equal opportunities across all Force activities;
  - recruitment, selection and appointment;
  - administration of leave arrangements;
  - performance management and appraisal, including the establishment and maintenance of a competence framework for the force;
- identification of individual and organisational training needs on a regular basis and coordination of training and career development;
- preparing staff for promotion and coordinating the promotion system;
- managing arrangements for the transfer and secondment of staff;
- maintenance of an effective succession planning system for key posts;
- negotiation and administration of entitlements to compensation and benefits and coordination of the Force Reward and Recognition system (see below);
- implementation of the JCF’s policies and activities relating to health, safety and well-being, including the implementation of HIV/AIDS awareness, welfare and counselling services and funeral arrangements (currently under the Community Policing and Community Safety Branch);
- maintenance of employee relations (in collaboration with the MNS) to foster good employee communication and provide the opportunity for speedy resolution of individual grievance and collective disputes;
- maintenance of HR records, including the establishment and management of an HR database.

The HR function should, as a general rule, be staffed by civilians and not sworn police officers; however, a healthy balance is required. It is important that regardless of category of employee, he or she must bring appropriate HR training, competencies and experience.

Once the HR function is fully established and appropriate policies, procedures, manuals and systems are in place, some day-to-day HR functions (e.g. administration of the performance management system, resolution of non-disciplinary related performance issues, and the administration of leave arrangements) should be delegated to police managers. This is in line with the concept of divisional primacy where divisional commanders have the flexibility to manage their staff according to local needs.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>70.</th>
<th>The MNS should engage with the Ministry of Finance and the Public Service to resolve any outstanding issues impeding the establishment of a civilian HR unit.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>71.</td>
<td>The JCF should staff and make functional its civilian HR function as a matter of priority.</td>
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<tr>
<td>72.</td>
<td>The JCF should ensure that its HR function is staffed with an appropriate blend of professional civilian staff and that only qualified, sworn police officers be deployed into the function on an as-needed basis and if they are suitably qualified.</td>
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<tr>
<td>73.</td>
<td>By year three (3) of implementation, JCF managers should be equipped to receive delegated responsibility, on a day-to-day basis, for some HR functions.</td>
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The current suite of HR systems (e.g. recruitment, promotion, discipline and training) is
being widely indicated as in need of reform. Combined, they impede, among other things, the attraction and retention of talent, both at senior levels and among the rank and file. These systems must be upgraded, integrated and aligned to support the future organisation. We have covered the need to reform the discipline system elsewhere in this report. Below we cover a range of other HR issues that need attention.

8.1.1 Recruitment

The importance of recruiting and recruit training cannot be overstated. The individuals who are attracted to the profession of policing and ultimately selected and prepared for a career in the ranks of the JCF are the organisation's lifeblood. The right selections, buttressed by sound training and ongoing learning and support, will to a large extent define the future culture and effectiveness of the organisation. With this in mind, the Panel looked at current arrangements for recruitment to the force to establish if improvements could be made that would assist the JCF to resolve its recruitment issues. The Panel identified a number of issues that need to be addressed.

The recruitment policy and procedures of the JCF are outlined in Chapter 18 and 19 of the Police Service Regulations (1961) Under current arrangements, the PSC has extensive responsibilities that in a modern police organisation would fall within the domain of the Commissioner and delegated by him to an HR function as a matter of practice. While this ensures a level of impartiality and accountability, it adds an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy and constrains the ability of Commissioner of Police to determine the shape and nature of his workforce.

To meet increasing requirements for more sworn police officers on the streets, in response to attrition and growth demands, the Police Academy is under pressure to accept less-than-acceptable applicants. We are advised that upwards of 75% of male applicants accepted as recruits do not meet the basic requirements for engagement. Until such time as the JCF is able to attract top-quality candidates in sufficient numbers, a programme needs to be put in place to assist those who lack the necessary academic credentials to get them. It should be the responsibility of the JCF to develop the necessary partnership with the school system to provide the academic upgrading and corresponding testing. As a matter of principle, no one should be able to join the organisation without having met the basic requirements.

Height requirements (minimums of – M: 5’7”; F: 5’5” according to JCF website) are undoubtedly eliminating otherwise-qualified candidates from the service. Most modern police organisations have moved away from such prescribed (and arbitrary) restrictions, opting instead to move to physical testing that align with the genuine occupational requirements of the profession. The Metropolitan Police in the UK and all Canadian police services eliminated both height and weight restrictions some time ago in favour of the more appropriate/defendable physical abilities testing. Similarly, the upper restriction on age of recruits (currently 30 years) has little defendable basis and is inconsistent with a modern police organisation. Once again, the selection emphasis should be based on physical and other abilities and qualifications.

All recruiting activities are conducted by JCF police personnel. The current situation calls for much of the recruiting function to be in the hands of professional HR personnel with extensive experience in this field. Above, the panel has recommended that the embryonic civilian HR function for the JCF is established and staffed as a matter of priority. Once established, all responsibility for recruitment should be managed by the civilian function.
This will free up police resources for core policing. In addition, consideration should be given to outsourcing key components of the recruitment process to a respected private enterprise with specialisation in recruiting to avoid the need for a large recruiting team to be maintained in-house.

A key initiative aimed at professionalising the JCF was the Graduate Entry Programme. This programme, which has had three intakes since its inception in the mid 1990s, has fallen short of its stated objectives. The majority of candidates entered directly from outside of the JCF with very strong academic and work experience credentials; many participants have graduate degrees in a range of relevant fields. Current GEP personnel should be key ambassadors to other well-educated prospective recruits. We believe that a thorough review is required of the programme.

There must be a concerted and coordinated approach involving the JCF, the GoJ, local government, both political parties, the business and academic communities to actively promote policing as a worthy career choice for bright young people. A cadet programme of a similar nature to that operated by the JDF should be instigated in schools to give young people a taste of policing and encourage them to consider the JCF as a career. The JDF cadet programme may provide a good model on which the JCF could draw.

### 8.1.1.1 Personnel security vetting of recruits

As mentioned elsewhere in this report, the personnel security vetting arrangements in the JCF are not currently in line with international standards and guidelines, and are in need of revision. A recommendation has been made that personnel security vetting arrangements should be reviewed and upgraded. In relation to recruits, there are further concerns; anecdotal evidence suggests that some steps in the security screening component of the selection process are not currently being conducted, or are being treated lightly by those responsible for conducting such enquiries. This could have a profound negative impact on not only the quality and suitability of recruits, but also the overall level of integrity of the organisation and must be addressed.

The JCF has recently adopted the use of a variety of psychometric tests in its recruiting process; this is a positive and progressive move. Polygraph testing is not currently used in the recruiting process. Polygraph testing can be a very effective means of testing the integrity of potential recruits and their credentials at the outset of the process, but is costly. While such use may be considered in the longer term, once there is increased capacity within the JCF to conduct such tests, there are cost-effective alternatives that can address the conscientiousness of prospective candidates. One such tool is currently employed by other police organisations, including the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Conscientiousness testing is a highly cost-effective, reliable and valid alternative that should be considered at this time.

| 74.  | The JCF should implement a policy that requires all recruits accepted into its training programme to (a) meet the basic requirements and (b) pass security screening. |
| 75.  | Height, weight and age restrictions on recruitment should be eliminated and replaced by an appropriate and bona fide physical ability test. |
| 76.  | Arrangements for the security vetting of recruits should be reviewed and upgraded in line with the upgrading of security vetting across the organisation |
77. There should be an increased emphasis placed on the integrity, values and conscientiousness of potential recruits. To this end, the JCF should explore the employment of a reliable and valid conscientiousness testing instrument.

78. The MNS should engage the JCF and civil society (including academia and the business community) in a concerted long-term initiative to promote the JCF as a viable career alternative for bright and capable Jamaicans.

79. The JCF, in partnership with local academic institution(s), should develop an academic upgrading programme to assist non-academically qualified but otherwise suitable candidates to achieve the required academic credentials to allow them to enter the JCF.

80. The Graduate Entry Programme should be revitalised and expanded as a means of attracting university graduates into the ranks of the service.

81. The Cadet Programme should be reinstituted with such modifications to ensure it meets the modern requirements of the force.

82. The JCF should conduct a full feasibility study to determine which specific elements of the recruiting process can be outsourced and implement outsourcing at the earliest opportunity.

83. The GoJ should make a significant capital investment in the Twickenham Park training facility to ensure it provides a safe and contemporary learning environment for recruits.

8.1.2 Training

Training and development of staff is not only important to the overall effectiveness of an organisation, but also to individual job satisfaction and career progression. If the JCF is to become a modern policing service, and retain the best staff, it must have a clear focus on training and development, and this focus coordinated with its overall vision and objectives.

The JCF currently separates training into two distinct parts: Recruit training and in-service training. In addition, there are two training establishments: the Police Academy for recruit training and training of the rank and file, and the Staff College which provides in-service training. The Police Academy and the Staff College are co-located at Twickenham Park. There is a well-considered and articulated Training Strategy and Plan (2008), however, the plan needs to be updated to bring it in line with the needs of a contemporary police organisation founded on the principles of partnerships, community policing, accountability and integrity. If updated and implemented, the strategy would go a long way towards re-
orienting JCF training towards the above principles.

8.1.2.1 Recruit training

The current approach and curriculum for recruit training are outdated and more aligned with ‘building soldiers’ than developing modern competent community-oriented police officers. Approximately 20% of the recruit curriculum is focused on foot and weapons drill. As one senior officer commented, “We train them like soldiers. We tell them when to eat, when to sleep, when to study; it’s high control. So they aren’t equipped for reality once they leave the Academy.” He went on to say that furthermore, because of the high control environment, staff are not able to see certain potentially problematic behaviours they might otherwise have been able to help recruits modify.

While the JCF recruit training programme is based in the CAPRA, an internationally accepted problem-solving model, it is only loosely so, according to senior officers. For example, as it relates to training on the use of force, few officers are adequately trained in the context of a proper use of force continuum.

Over the last two years, only 5.4% (3.9% in 2006 and 6.6% in 2007) of recruits failed to graduate. This is considerably lower than other international police training institutions and may be cause for further examination as it may be an indication that the level of expectation regarding achievement is set too low for expediency sake.

Virtually all those involved in the curriculum development, training and oversight of recruits are sworn police officers. Most do not have university degrees. There is scope for civilianisation of aspects of the Police Academy programme; qualified civilian professionals should be blended with qualified police experts to help reorient the curriculum towards the principles of community policing and employ sound, adult-learning methods within a policing environment.

In the past, the JCF operated a Tutor Constable System that was designed to provide recruits with on-the-job training and guidance once they were assigned to their first post within the Force. In this way, recruit training and development was continued for a more intensive period following graduation from the Police Academy. This programme should be reactivated, with a clear focus to instilling in recruits not only good policing practice through active learning and job shadowing, but also appropriate values and behaviours. Only the JCF’s top performers should be considered as tutors/mentors and they should be provided with appropriate training for the tutor role. To emphasise the importance placed on learning, development and coaching, tutors/mentors should be awarded additional compensation for this role.

| 84. | Immediate steps should be taken to revamp the entire recruit training programme and align it with organisational strategy and the principles of a modern, community-oriented police service. |
| 85. | The JCF should engage civilian professionals to deliver some aspects of the programme within an appropriate mix of civilians and qualified police personnel. |
| 86. | Recruits should be provided with in-depth training on a graduated use-of-force continuum and human rights. |
87. The tutor constable System should be re-implemented, aligned with the modern policing needs of the JCF with a particular emphasis on values and behaviours.

8.1.2.2 In-service training

In-service training for all ranks has taken place at the Staff College. A recent strategy document prepared by the Staff College identified a number of gaps in the in-service training programme. In summary, the report indicated that the in-service training programme had little linkage to preparing personnel for future roles at the supervisory, management or leadership levels. It is clear that learning and development have not been considered part of a strategy to improve the management, culture and productivity of the JCF. As previously stated, the JCF Training Strategy and Plan 2008 documentation provides a more than adequate direction for in-service training. But there is a need to take this document and align it with the future vision for policing and the JCF.

As an integral part of the reform initiative, JCF employees at all levels will need to be provided with specific in-training opportunities both to ensure they have the required policing skills and also to help realign the culture of the JCF towards partnerships and the values commonly found in modern police services. Of particular importance in this latter context will be management and leadership training to support the JCF into its transition to a more participatory style of management, less hindered by rules and regulations. Managers at all levels will need to learn how to manage, make decisions, communicate successfully, encourage performance and determine for themselves how best to organise their resources so as to deliver effective community-focused police services. These skills are currently not routinely fostered within the JCF.

The college currently offers a Junior Command Course for inspectors, a Command Course for the superintendent ranks and a Strategic Command Course for the most senior officers. The College has recently also piloted a supervisors course for the ranks of Constable to Sergeant. While the Junior Command and Command Course operate, the Strategic Command Course has not been run for a considerable time.

The operation of the command courses, and introduction of the supervisory course, is commendable and certainly a step in the right direction in terms of developing essential management skills and behaviours in the JCF. However, the courses do not cover a range of skills that the panel considers as essential to modern policing management, such as: project management, financial management, performance management, contemporary leadership skills with an emphasis on a people-oriented approach to achieving results. With this in mind, the panel believes that the course curricula should be reviewed and revised to include these elements.

As emphasised in the section on Leadership and management structure,

88. The existing JCF Learning Strategy 2005-2008 should be reviewed and updated to ensure it aligns with the needs and interests of a contemporary police organisation.

89. An academic board consisting of academics and practitioners with the appropriate credentials in adult learning, and other pertinent areas of specialisation, should be established to oversee the realignment of the
8.1.3 Promotion

The JCF has a ‘Selection Procedures for Promotion’ policy document (revised: 2004) that provides a reasonable approach to selection and promotion. When vacancies in the rank of Corporal and Sergeant arise, and are to be filled, the Commissioner selects those who are to be promoted. In relation to the rank of inspector, deputy superintendent, superintendent and senior superintendent, the PSC will select those to be promoted from the list submitted by the Commissioner who will append his recommendations. However, the procedures do not appear to be consistently applied in practice, and are easily manipulated and delayed. As such, the JCF promotion system is viewed universally as being without credibility, ineffective and unfair. Often cited has been the ‘who you know is more important than what you know and can contribute’ phenomenon. Of further concern is the number of cases for senior level promotion that have been presented to the PSC for officers with outstanding disciplinary charges. This is further discussed at Section 6.

The JCF must enforce its policy on selection and promotion. Decisions on promotion and transfer must be made in an open and transparent manner and are based on a fair and objective assessment of performance, skills and experience. This will ensure that all positions are filled by the most suitable staff whose capabilities have been objectively assessed and that all staff who may be interested in and eligible for, have an opportunity to apply for and be considered fairly for promotion.

The JCF should review its existing implementation arrangements for selection and promotion to identify areas where it may be open to abuse and then address these weaknesses as a matter of urgency. This review should ensure that the promotion system is clearly linked to an effective competence-based performance appraisal system (as recommended above in Section 6). Once established, the JCF’s civilian HR unit should take responsibility for the administration of both the performance appraisal and promotion systems to ensure that they are professionally and competently managed. In addition, the administration of the promotion system should receive special attention from both the inspector general and the MNS’s internal audit team until such time as it is considered to be fair and robust.

As a general principle, no staff should be considered for promotion while they have an outstanding disciplinary case pending.

93. As a priority, the JCF must enforce its existing promotion system so that its implementation is transparent and merit-based.
94. The JCF’s new civilian HR unit should be given the responsibility for the administration of the promotion system, including preparation of cases for the PSC.

95. The promotion system should be linked to an effective competence-based performance appraisal system.

96. No staff should be considered for promotion while they have an outstanding disciplinary case pending.

97. The JCF promotion system should receive special attention from both the inspector general and the MNS’s internal audit team until such time as it is considered to be fair and robust.

8.1.4 Career management and succession planning

Most successful organisations do not just happen to ‘find’ successful leaders and effective managers, they actively ‘grow’ them; and this is what the JCF needs to do in the longer term.

At present, there are no processes in place by which the JCF can identify the potential of staff or their most appropriate career path given their skills and aptitudes. This means that staff may not be receiving appropriate training and development at the most appropriate time in their career or matched to the most appropriate positions across the organisation; this is a potential waste of both talent and experience. Furthermore, staff may find it difficult to move into positions of interest leading to a lack of career satisfaction and possibly resignation. Of greater concern is the lack of arrangements in place to support succession planning. Succession planning is necessary so that the JCF can ensure it always has a number of suitably qualified and experienced staff who can step into key positions which are essential to the critical operations of the JCF and the meeting of its strategic objectives.

Further to issues relating to career management is the JCF approach to transferring staff between posts. Staff who may have recently received relevant training and who are qualified for a position may be transferred to another post with little reference to their skills, experience, interests or promotion potential. This not only is an inefficient use of skills and experience, but is also demoralising for staff who have a particular interest in an area of work or who may be trying to increase their chances of promotion. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the transfer policy may also be misused to deal with performance issues or to avoid disciplinary charges.

The lack of career development and succession planning, coupled with the misuse of the transfer policy, have contributed directly to the JCF’s problems in growing potential leaders and effective managers, and retaining good staff across the organisation. We believe that the JCF needs to implement effective policies and processes for career development, succession planning and enforce the transfer policy. This would:

- ensure all staff are supported and encouraged in the development of their careers and thus remain motivated, committed and involved in the work of the JCF and their own development;

- ensure that all staff receive the right training and development at the right times in their careers to support career development;
• provide the JCF with a clear understanding of its ability to fill posts internally with suitably competent and skilled candidates as the need arises;

• assist the JCF to identify the posts for which it may need to look outside of the organisation for suitably qualified staff;

• ensure that the JCF has a plan for providing a cadre of competent, confident and prepared staff who are able to apply for ‘key posts’ within the organisation as they become available;

• ensure that the process for appointing staff to ‘key posts’ is fair and transparent.

Any new arrangements put in place should be closely linked to the new performance appraisal system recommended at Section 6 to ensure that decisions are transparent, based on performance and related to training and development needs.

98. The JCF should design and implement a process for managing the career development of all staff linked to training and development needs.

99. The JCF should implement a succession planning process for key positions across the organisation.

8.2 Compensation

In other democratic countries, police compensation is based on the principle that police are paid a premium that reflects the dangerous and unique nature of police work that distinguishes it from other segments of the public service. An example of this principle at work is from the RCMP (Canada). Section 42 of the RCMP Regulations states that a member ‘shall take appropriate police action to aid any person who is exposed to danger or who is in a situation where danger may be impending’. This section reflects the essence of the difference between the RCMP and other public service groups. It is important to note that the obligation created by Section 42 of the Regulations applies whether a member is on duty or not and applies anywhere in Canada. While not wanting to diminish the importance of the work performed by other parts of the Canadian Public Service, the principle employed in Canada is that the daily work of the police is fundamentally different than that of the rest of the Public Service. In fulfilling their duties, police are authorised through the Criminal Code to temporarily suspend liberty and take a human life if circumstances dictate. These decisions are often made in a split second. The unique responsibilities and work environment serve to distinguish the police, as reflected in compensation schemes.

Compensation of JCF members has surfaced repeatedly as an issue of concern, particularly but not only among JCF members. Many suggest that the lack of proper compensation is a key contributor to the corruption that permeates the organisation.

We made a broad comparison of current police compensation between two (2) groups of employees. In the first place, comparison was with other public servants, including fire fighters, prison warders, nurses, doctors and civil servants. Secondly, comparison was made with private sector employees operating within the financial services sector. Data was drawn from the Ministry of Finance and the Public Service in respect to public servants (2008) and from a private salary survey (2007), in respect to the financial services sector.
The tables setting out the comparisons are at Appendix G.

There is considerable disparity in pay between the private and public sectors. At the mean and median levels, private sector clerical officers earn over JD$1 million, supervisory and middle managers earn up to JD$5 million, and senior and executive managers earn over JD$8 million. The earnings extend to over JD$12 million annually at the assistant general manager level. Chief executive officers earn much more on an annual basis.

The police are generally comparable in pay with the other public officers, and, in many instances, are paid higher. For instance, in respect to the warders and firefighters, the police are generally better paid, rank by rank. In respect to nurses and civil servants, police are paid better at the higher levels, but are generally comparable at the lower levels. However, in comparison with the private sector, police pay is very low, particularly at the rank and file levels. At these levels, sergeants and inspectors who have heavy responsibilities are equivalent to clerical and junior supervisory personnel in the private sector, while constables and corporals earn significantly less.

In addition to their salaries, JCF staff receives a range of financial benefits ranging from travel to housing allowances. The allowance arrangements are complex; over time, as each has been added, they have become more fiercely defended by the police who see them as a means to augment their low salaries. Further to financial benefits, JCF staff have more leave provisions than any other police organisation known to panel members. In total, with annual leave of 35 days per annum, departmental leave of 14 days per annum, together with up to 28 days sick leave annually, the leave package represents a significant liability to the organisation not seen elsewhere. The policies surrounding these entitlements are also questionable; for example, members can bank leave and take several months off at a time. This is inefficient and may leave the force open to risk if personnel with critical knowledge and experience are not available for long periods.

Appropriate compensation is critical to the JCF in being able to attract and retain the most competent and committed staff and also in deterring them from engaging in illegal activities to supplement their incomes. The panel believes that police remuneration in Jamaica, particularly at the rank and file level, should be increased as a matter of urgency. The pay levels are neither attractive to skilled people who would like to join the JCF, nor are they adequate to allow staff to enjoy a reasonable and respectful standard of living and reduce the risk of corruption or the need for them to take on additional employment.

However, simply saying the JCF should be paid more is not a defensible position. To encourage the performance-based environment required to encourage accountability, rates of pay and additional allowances must be commensurate with the nature of work performed and performance. To ensure that JCF pay is fairly assessed and any increases appropriate to rank, roles and performance, we believe the JCF should carry out a formal review of rank and pay. This review should link to the establishment of output-oriented job descriptions as part of the introduction of the new performance appraisal system. We strongly recommend that as part of this exercise, serious consideration be given to the streamlining of leave and other benefits (financial and non-financial) as a means of balancing the overall JCF compensation package.

The JCF’s future approach to reward and recognition must constantly reinforce its desired values. The future JCF will be very different from the organisation that exists today. To create an effective incentive system, the PSC and the Commissioner of Police, with the help of a team of professional advisors, should undertake a thorough audit of the existing...
arrangements and recommend appropriate changes. Any Reward and Recognition Programme developed should address financial and non-financial rewards and be linked to the introduction of the new performance appraisal system recommended in Section 6. This will ensure that increases in pay and rewards are clearly connected to the achievement of performance targets. This will, over time, increase the transparency and fairness of pay and reward across the organisation and also encourage accountability.

100. The Government should carry out a comprehensive rank and compensation review to establish an appropriate framework for future compensation in the JCF; as part of this review, serious consideration should be given to the streamlining of leave and other benefits (financial and non-financial) as a means of balancing the overall JCF compensation package.

101. The JCF should review current arrangements for reward and recognition and develop a new reward and recognition programme linked directly performance and the introduction of a new performance appraisal system. This programme should address financial and non-financial incentives.

### 8.3 Buildings and Facilities

The JCF estate has been in a poor condition for some years. The deterioration of the estate has been due, in part, to a lack of capital investment in maintenance. The standard of individual buildings depends on whether they are rented, the level of maintenance received, and whether the community is involved in upkeep. Some police stations and buildings suffer from insufficient space for personnel and equipment, while others have broken windows, degraded lock-up facilities and insanitary bathroom arrangements.

The majority of police stations and buildings are old and follow archaic designs that are not compatible with a community-based focus. Often, they offer no separate rooms for interview, inadequate provisions for victims and witnesses, and no female accommodation or adequate privacy. Some stations are unsuited to operational needs; parking for vehicles is often limited, which has an impact on vehicle security and condition. The JCF's focus on community policing and safety means that the police estate is highly visible and the appearance and repair of police stations is a constant source of public complaint.

On devolvement of the JCF budget to the JCF Finance Branch in 2002, the JCF became responsible for the maintenance and repair of police stations and other JCF buildings. Weaknesses in the management of the estate by the JCF, rising public concern at the condition of police stations and MNS’ concern that the estate was becoming a drain on resources have led to the ministry taking back responsibility for management of repairs. Since that time, the MNS has initiated a programme on a rolling basis, to identify and repair police stations and buildings, upgrade others and in some cases, build new facilities. This arrangement is maintained also because of the ministry’s direct management of the JCF capital budget.

Nonetheless, the JCF estate remains in need of capital investment. The training complex at Twickenham Park is of particular concern. Working conditions are poor in many buildings which also lack basic office equipment. This contributes to the image of the JCF as a poor employer making it harder to attract competent staff. It also encourages a lack of accountability among some existing staff who do not consider it important to conduct
maintenance of buildings and facilities given their current condition. We understand the considerable financial constraints under which the GoJ is operating and that requests for capital funds are difficult to meet given the fiscal situation. However, we believe that if the JCF is to attract and retain good staff and increase the quality of its overall performance, the JCF estate must be given priority and significant investment made in its reconfiguration and refurbishment.

The panel is concerned that there is insufficient focus on establishing – prior to repair – whether police stations are in the correct location to serve the needs of the public, or whether police services might be delivered through more effective and efficient means. Policing styles and resources have changed significantly since many police stations were established and ICT and transport links have made the police more accessible to the public. In this context, it is no longer safe to assume that the police station is the best means by which to deliver police services, nor that the current police station configuration remains the most appropriate given changes to crime rates and demographics.

The panel considers that the JCF and the MNS should work together to conduct a review of the current configuration of police stations taking into account possible alternative means of delivering police services. This will not only ensure that scarce capital expenditure on police station repairs and refurbishment is spent in the most effective way, but potentially other efficiency savings could be made through alternative service delivery models.

102. The GoJ should make provision for significant capital investment into the JCF estate to bring it to a standard where it can meet the needs of a modern police service, including meeting the needs of staff as well as communities.

103. Prior to making this capital investment, the MNS and the JCF should review the current location of police stations and identify any that is not appropriately located or where policing services could be delivered more effectively by alternative means. The findings from the review should be integrated into the overall programme to repair and upgrade the JCF estate.

8.4 Information and communications technology

Currently, information technology is not viewed or used strategically to increase the JCF’s overall efficiency or effectiveness. The organisation lacks a comprehensive IT strategy that aligns with its future business requirements. In this section, we will examine a number of excellent initiatives to improve the organisation’s operational response through technology. What this masks, however, is a lack of a basic IT architecture or competence across the JCF.

For several years there had not been any significant new investment in technology in the JCF to replace aged and in some instance obsolete technology, or to acquire new technology in use by modern and professional police organisations. Over the last three to four (3-4) years, however, there has been a significant increase in capital expenditure for technology projects as the threat of crime and violence in Jamaica reached increasingly intolerable levels, and the lack of critical investigative and other capacities in the JCF became clearer. In this context, the MNS was of the view that strengthening the technical capabilities of the JCF would increase the probability that someone committing a crime will be arrested, charged and brought to justice. This has led to the inception and roll-out of a
significant programme of ICT projects for the JCF, including the following:

- Integrated Ballistics Identification System (IBIS) – commissioned into service in February 2006;
- Automated Palm and Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) – commissioned into service in October 2006;
- Upgrade of the JCF Wireless Communication Network – commissioned into service in 2nd Q FY 2007/08 (September 2007). The project comprised two elements – the supply of a new, modern, state-of-the-art, Digital Microwave Bearer Network, and the mixed mode, analogue-digital SmartZone 4.1 Mobile Radio Network;

Other projects currently being implemented include the following:

- Closed-Circuit Television Surveillance systems (CCTV);
- A new management information system (MIS) as part of an integrated management information system (IMIS) that includes the JCF, the Department of Correctional Services and the courts. This is being undertaken by the Citizen Security and Justice Programme (CSJP), a GoJ and Inter-American Development Bank, funded programme, in conjunction with the MNS.

Building the absorptive capacity of the JCF to be able to benefit from the new technologies has been a difficult and complex issue for both the ministry and the JCF. The mere acquisition of technology provides absolutely no assurances that the JCF will be able to use the technology effectively and efficiently in preventing and solving crimes. This is particularly the case with IBIS and AFIS.

There is an urgent need to address issues such as:

- strategic management of the new technologies;
- re-engineering of business processes required to integrate the new technology into working practices;
- recruitment and training of staff to use and support the systems;
- redefinition of job descriptions particularly relating to investigation and use of the systems;
- identifying, documenting and disseminating standard operating procedures to support integration of the new systems with business processes;
- drawing on the lessons learned from other police organisations in implementing and using similar technologies.

This raises the questions of where, in terms of implementation, the responsibilities of the
MNS end and those of the JCF begin. In this context, a number of challenges exist – the need to have these issues addressed from project inception; the need to have adequate resources (financial and human) allocated from the outset to undertake these activities; the need to have the JCF leadership recognise that realisation of the benefits of the new technology also means the JCF has to change the way it is managed and operated. In addition, in most cases, the procurement of new technologies (capital expenditure) carries with it the need for new operating resources and usually there are inadequate recurrent budgetary provisions in place. This serves to detract from the effective use of the new technology.

At a strategic level, the development of the technical capabilities of the JCF would benefit from the development of an Information and Communications Technology (ICT) strategic plan. One does not exist and this has a number of adverse implications: There is the absence of a blueprint for development and as a consequence technologies are being acquired in an unsystematic way and, once acquired, are not integrated or deployed effectively. Greater attention is required to ensure effectiveness and value for money.

The internal JCF ICT support structure also is inadequate in terms of strategic leadership and direction, technical capacity, workforce availability and allocation of financial resources. The demands on the Police National Computer Centre (PNCC) have grown markedly over the last few years as the number of new applications procured for the JCF has increased, but the capacity of the PNCC has not been upgraded accordingly. The demands on the PNCC are projected to rise even more sharply in the near future as the IMIS is implemented. There are likely to be even further demands on the PNCC if the JCF leadership adopts the recommendations made in this report regarding modernising communication through the use of technology and a JCF intranet and the roll-out of an integrated intelligence solution to all Divisions.

104. The JCF should compile an ICT strategic plan to provide a blueprint for the future acquisition and integration of technologies. This should be coordinated with the overall ICT strategy currently being completed by the MNS for its entire portfolio.

105. The MNS and the JCF should review and redefine their respective role and responsibilities with regard to implementation of new technologies. The result of this redefinition should be embedded within an ICT strategy and PNCC working practices.

106. The Commissioner of Police should ensure that adequate resources (financial and human) are allocated to work alongside the MNS from the outset of each ICT project to ensure the smooth integration of new technologies into JCF standard operating procedures.

107. The Commissioner of Police should immediately engage with the MNS to develop a plan for the integration of IBIS and AFIS systems (and other systems as required) into JCF working practices and dedicate adequate resources (human and financial) to ensuring that the benefits of these systems are realised as intended across the force. Assistance should be sought from the MNS to engage technical assistance as appropriate.

108. The size, structure and responsibilities of the PNCC should be reviewed and
the unit provided with adequate staff and support to enable it to meet the current and future ICT demands of the JCF. As part of this process, the civilianisation of the PNCC should be completed and police staff currently working there redeployed elsewhere on core policing duties.

8.4.1 General IT systems and competence

Some staff have access to desktop PCs and laptops, but the organisation remains largely paper-based. Knowledge management is weak, with much data held on paper in the different areas and units and there is limited support for collaboration or knowledge sharing, key requirements to effective policing today.

The new JCF will need to place greater emphasis on joined-up working and communication with the MNS, other Government agencies, community partners and other stakeholders. Access to e-mail will be critical for communicating effectively and speedily both internally and externally. Currently, e-mail is available to most staff within the JCF but the majority do not have JCF or ministry e-mail addresses. This means that a large proportion of the organisation, including senior managers is conducting JCF business using personal e-mail accounts (Yahoo, Gmail, Infochan, etc.). This presents a significant security risk to the JCF and MNS.

Internet access is available to the majority of JCF staff. Access to the Internet can be a valuable source of news and information, and is essential for those staff in research and policy, corporate planning, Inspection, legal affairs and public affairs. Providing Internet access to all staff in the JCF may make the JCF systems more vulnerable not only from hostile attack or viruses, but also from sensitive information being passed outside of the ministry, using personal e-mail, either erroneously or intentionally. It is important that the JCF not only ensures it has the most appropriate and up to date firewall and anti-virus software, but that adequate security measures and protocols are put in place to monitor inappropriate use of the Internet by staff.

The JCF should undertake a training needs analysis to establish current IT training needs and design a training programme to deliver remedial and advanced training as required. In addition, IT competence should be monitored on a regular basis through the proposed new performance appraisal system.

109. The use of personal e-mail accounts for the conduct of JCF business should be prohibited and all JCF staff who have need of e-mail access provided with a secure, JCF or MNS e-mail address.

110. The JCF should undertake a training needs analysis to establish current IT training needs and design and deliver a training programme to meet these needs; this should include protocols on access and use of the Internet which should be communicated to all staff and monitored through the Office of the Inspector General.

111. IT competence among JCF staff should be monitored on a regular basis
through the proposed new performance appraisal system.
9. Implementing the changes

As detailed in Section 4 of this report, there have been six (6) reviews of the JCF and significant efforts by the JCF, the MNS and external donors to fundamentally change the way the JCF operates and to create a more modern police service for Jamaica. So far, despite these efforts, reform has been piecemeal and the fundamental change anticipated has not occurred. The reasons why reform has failed are complex and have come into play at different times over the last 18 years. These include:

- insufficient championing of change by the MNS and Cabinet. In particular, the ministry has not been sufficiently involved in driving the reform;
- a lack of sufficient championing of fundamental change by the High Command;
- insufficient funding made available by GoJ for some aspects of change required;
- a reluctance on the part of the MNS and the JCF to tackle difficult areas of reform particularly relating to structure, leadership, the suitability of staff to fill key posts, the distribution of functional responsibilities and accountability and cultural issues;
- a lack of focus on sustaining an adequate JCF implementation team with sufficiently able people to spearhead the reform process across the JCF;
- insufficient effort by the ministry, the PSC and, more recently, the PCOA, focused on monitoring implementation of recommendations by the JCF and holding the JCF to account for non delivery of reforms within agreed timescales;
- a focus on implementing specific changes to operational areas rather than tackling fundamental organisational issues which are inhibiting overall change.

This review will be the seventh that has taken place since 1991. This situation of repeated reviews, intermittent support and piecemeal implementation of recommendations cannot continue. As set out in the sections above, the JCF is affected by a number of significant difficulties which are rooted at the core of the organisation in the very way it is structured, staffed and operated. The lack of successful reform has brought the JCF to a tipping point. Gradual small-scale changes are no longer sufficient and incisive action is essential to effect a radical large-scale transformational change. The present situation provides an unprecedented opportunity for the JCF and GoJ stakeholders to demonstrate that they have learned from the past and can act incisively.

9.1 The approach to implementation

The challenge now facing the Government, MNS and the JCF is how to make reform happen quickly and resolutely but in a manner that assures also its long-term success and sustainability. While this is dependent on many things, a significant factor will be the approach adopted to achieve the transformation. The history of JCF reform has not been an enviable one. Most large-scale transformations have failed to achieve the desired state of reform. In considering a recommended approach, we have taken account of this. A new approach to reform, that maintains a clear and unequivocal focus on staying the course, is
required.

There are many things that can be tackled early in bringing about reform. However, a well-considered long-term plan is essential, since reforms of this nature by definition normally take about three to five years to implement. A carefully planned, choreographed and executed plan is essential.

Some whom we have engaged have proposed what amounts to a ‘big bang’ approach. In this scenario, the JCF would be disbanded and reconstituted – in one move – as a new police service under a new legislative framework and with a new structure, leadership team, functional responsibilities, staff, uniforms and, where possible, equipment. We consider this approach dangerous and ill-advised. Incisive action is required but, as indicated above, as part of a well-considered plan that addresses the short, medium and longer terms.

The approach we advocate includes initial incisive action to change the structure, leadership and management of the JCF, followed by a corresponding longer term programme of targeted reform to tackle the fundamental issues raised in this report, such as working conditions, recruitment, training and improving overall capacity. Perhaps most importantly, however, the approach we advocate incorporates an independent oversight mechanism and public reporting, something that has served others undergoing similar reforms well.

In the remainder of this section we set out in more detail:

- a critical path and implementation considerations;
- recommendations for internal JCF change leadership;
- recommendations for external oversight and monitoring of implementation;
- recommendations for communicating during the change.

112. The GoJ should adopt an approach to implementation that combines initial incisive action with a longer term managed change programme. This will provide the best opportunity to signal the transformation while ensuring that the changes are manageable and there is sufficient focus on sustainability.

9.2 Action plan

An action plan setting out the critical path for implementation can be found at Appendix H. It includes an indicative time frame for implementation and indicates where technical assistance is likely to be required – based on the available skills within the JCF and the MNS.

9.3 Time frame for implementation

The Action Plan has been designed to be implemented over three (3) calendar years – 2008 to 2011. The time frame and complete transformation plan should be re-evaluated annually throughout the course of implementation.
9.4 Internal leadership implementation

The successful implementation of the measures required to fully reform the JCF requires the full attention of the Commissioner of Police. This cannot be led from anywhere else in the organisation. However, we recognise that the commissioner has other responsibilities as well, thus he will require the direct assistance of a dedicated Implementation manager drawn from within the JCF to lead the transformation on a day-to-day basis.

The implementation manager should:

- report to the commissioner and provide a clear, single point of coordination for the transformation programme;
- take direct responsibility for implementation of some cross-cutting aspects of the programme, such as the integration and achievement of change management and cultural change activities;
- possess the required competence and experience for this role.

He or she should be supported by a ‘programme advisor’, ideally with experience in leading transformational change in a police or security setting. This advisor should assist with managing the programme successfully.

113. A dedicated JCF senior staff member should be appointed as implementation manager by the Commissioner of Police to lead the transformation on a day-to-day basis. He or she should report directly to the Commissioner of Police.

114. The implementation manager should be supported by a programme advisor, whose role would be to mentor and assist the JCF implementation manager to manage the programme successfully; he or she should ideally have experience of implementing transformational change in a police or security setting.

Once appointed, the JCF implementation manager should, in collaboration with the Commissioner of Police, establish an internal transformation team who should be engaged full time on the transformation effort. The internal transformation team should:

- report to the implementation manager and through him or her, to the commissioner;
- be comprised of both police and civilian personnel who bring a mix of passion, experience, education and experience to effectively drive out the required reforms.

Critical in this context will be the experience of, and training in, change management. The internal transformation team must work closely with others, including the MNS and PSC, in the development of timelines, milestones and deliverables to ensure that there is agreement over plans and financial support is available.

115. An internal transformation team should be established by the JCF to support implementation of the recommendations made in this report. The team must work closely with others, including the PSC and the MNS, in all aspects of reform.
There are many reform-minded members of the JCF, especially in the junior ranks. The implementation manager and transformation team should identify staff who are interested in supporting reform and draw them together into a network of ‘change champions’. These ‘champions’ would support the transformation team in the implementation of specific activities but, more importantly, also act as channels of communication to other JCF staff helping to convince them of the value of change.

Although most of the recommendations will affect primarily the JCF, some will have implications for other areas of Government, such as the Ministry of Justice. We recommend that early in the implementation process, the JCF implementation manager identifies the relevant stakeholders most affected and establishes a mechanism by which they can be consulted frequently and informed of progress throughout implementation.

| 116. The implementation manager should identify relevant stakeholders affected by the changes proposed and ensure a mechanism is established for regular consultation and communication with them during implementation. |

### 9.5 Oversight and monitoring of implementation

We consider that one of the weaknesses of previous reforms has been a lack of sufficient sponsorship from the ministry and PSC and external oversight to ensure agreed targets, timelines and milestones are met. To ensure that there is adequate external pressure to maintain the pace of reform, and to provide the MNS and the Commissioner of Police with adequate support, the panel proposes that a commission be established, named the Policing Reform Commission (PRC).

This commission would be temporary in nature. It would comprise a commissioner and two associates, appointed by the GoJ, to oversee and guide the implementation of the reforms proposed in the report. The reform commissioner should ideally be drawn from the local community, and appointed on a part time basis for the full five years of implementation. The other PRC members, appointed either domestic or from the international arena, should have the backgrounds, expertise and stature to provide effective leadership and oversight to this transformational change process. The PRC should be supported by a small secretariat.

Since the reforms set out in this report cross several organisational and institutional boundaries, it will be important that the GoJ makes clear to all parties its expectation of cooperation with the PRC. The PRC mandate should include the following terms:

- establish a timeline for reform, with milestones and deadlines for each critical element;
- advise the GoJ, the PSC, the MNS and the JCF on any additional legislative reforms that may be warranted;
- approve the JCF’s implementation plans;
- provide and support the JCF in building change management capacity.

The PRC should report publicly on a quarterly basis in years one (1) and two (2) of the transformation, and no longer than half-yearly thereafter. Its report should cover results
achieved, levels of support received, reasons for delays and challenges to progress. The PRC’s first report should be issued no later than December 15, 2008.

117. A Policing Reform Commission should be established for a period of five years to monitor, guide and oversee the implementation of reforms set out in this report.

118. In its communications, the GoJ should make clear its expectations that all parties will cooperate with the PRC in completing the reform programme.

119. The PRC should issue a public progress report quarterly through years one (1) and two (2), and then half-yearly thereafter.

9.6 Communication regarding implementation

Communicating effectively during times of organisational transformation is as much an art form as it is science. Effective change communication ensures that:

- the new vision is unambiguous;
- stakeholders (particularly employees) can see themselves in the new vision;
- the rationale and urgency for the change is compelling;
- those affected will be involved in decisions that affect them;
- there are good two-way communication mechanisms.

Poorly executed communications during reform can severely impact on the transformation, creating misunderstandings and diverting initiatives off course. For example, employee misunderstandings concerning the changes can quickly lead to resistance or hostility. The key to good communication lies in being transparent and open with stakeholders and engaging them as much as possible in the change process. The Commissioner of Police and the PRC will want pay close attention to how they communicate with staff and external stakeholders to ensure their commitment and buy-in to the transformation process.

It is important that this report and corresponding implementation plans be made public and shared with stakeholders. A critical part of the communication will be clear two-way communications with employees. They will be seeking first and foremost to establish how the proposed changes will affect them.

The JCF should immediately develop a comprehensive reform-oriented communications plan that focuses on both internal and external communication needs. Expert support should be considered in developing the early communications plan. The plan should include such things as:

- regular and frequent communications on progress;
- a series of ongoing staff meetings and other opportunities for face-to-face interaction with staff;
regular meetings of the SEC and SMT where the primary focus of discourse is reform-related;

regular staff surveys to establish acceptance and understanding levels, and to identify any areas that may need attention;

regular newsletters and meetings with external stakeholders to keep them informed of changes that may affect them and maintain their involvement and commitment.

As part of the reform implementation’s communications strategy, the commissioner, in partnership with the PRC, Ministry and other key stakeholders, should agree on an appropriate date for an official relaunching of the police service. This date should take into account progress being made on key areas of reform and such other criteria as the parties consider appropriate, including the readiness to introduce new symbols and value statements for the Jamaica Police Service.

120. The JCF should develop a comprehensive communications plan to guide implementation that focuses on both internal and external communication needs.

121. A communications expert with experience in change-related communications should be engaged to support the development and early implementation of this communications plan.

122. Strong consideration should be given to holding an official and public relaunching of the Jamaica Police Service at a date to be determined by the Minister of National Security, in consultation with the Commissioner of Police, the PSC and Policing Reform Commissioner.

9.7 Police advisors and technical assistance

Many of the proposed activities can be implemented by the JCF management team and staff, the PSC or the MNS. However, some are likely to require some kind of mentoring or other technical assistance. These areas are clearly identified in the action plan.

For some areas requiring support, the panel recommends that international or regional police advisors are deployed on a long-term (one to two years) basis to work alongside JCF staff and mentor them in the implementation of key strategies. The areas where we believe the support of long term police advisors would be invaluable are:

- rolling out community policing and safety;
- embedding divisional primacy;
- developing intelligence capacity, including at DIU level;
- serious and organised crime.

We do not recommend that these police advisors take line positions within the JCF; instead, they should work alongside JCF staff as external advisors.
There are a number of other areas where we believe civilian technical assistance should be provided. In this case, the support should be provided by local or international consultants with the requisite expertise and experience. These are:

- leadership and management training;
- establishment of an effective HR function for the JCF;
- civilianisation of non-core policing areas;
- establishment of an effective policy, planning and performance-monitoring function within the JCF;
- rationalisation of relationships between the PSC, PCOA and the MNS and merger of the PSC and PCOA to form the PSC.

123. A combination of police advisors and technical assistance should be made available to support the JCF in implementation of the recommendations made in this report.

124. Technical assistance should be provided to support the merger of the PCOA with the PSC, and strengthening of the PSC’s additional planning, monitoring and oversight responsibilities.

9.8 Costs

We have indicated above that the majority of the recommendations we have made can be implemented by the JCF, the MNS and the PSC. However, some areas will require technical assistance and some capital expenditure will be required for others.

The action plan indicates where technical assistance and capital expenditure will be required. We have not been able to establish capital costs for all aspects of the action plan. To ensure that costs are identified, work to cost the outstanding areas is recommended as an early implementation activity.

Overall, we estimate the cost of technical assistance to be US$8m over the three-year implementation period.

Capital expenditure over the three-year period is estimated to be:

- Twickenham Park refurbishment = JD$1bn;
- Police station refurbishment = approximately JD$3.6bn;
- IT infrastructure and strategy roll-out = JD$400m;
- Community policing/safety rollout = JD$50m;
- Anti-corruption strategy roll-out = JD$10m.
9.9 Funding and donor support

While some of the recommendations made in this report can be implemented by the JCF, the PSC and the MNS, others will require financial support. Given current fiscal constraints on the GoJ, the programme may be difficult for the GoJ to fund from the consolidated fund alone and external donor support will be required.

Previous JCF reform programmes have been supported by DFID, USAID and CIDA. We recommend that the MNS approach a range of donors, including the British, American and Canadian governments to secure financial assistance and support from police advisors and technical assistance.

The Government of Jamaica recently received financial support from the EU. Consideration should be given to whether a proportion of the EU funds may be directed to support the transformation of the JCF, particularly for capital expenditure.
10. Immediate next steps

The action plan anticipates an implementation start date of September 2008 as we believe that it will require a lead time of four (4) months for the JCF and the ministry to secure formal sign-off of the recommendations, by all stakeholders, identify funding from the Ministry of Finance and the Public Service (MoFPS) and donors, and identify potential advisors and technical assistance. This also provides a preparatory period for the JCF and others to work towards a higher state of change readiness.

In order to formally start implementation as planned in September, there are a number of pre-implementation activities that the JCF and the MNS need to address immediately. Below we set out some immediate next steps for the JCF and the ministry in preparation for implementation:

- the Commissioner of Police should formally sign off on the report and action plan;
- the Minister of National Security should formally sign off on the report and action plan;
- the content of the Report and Action Plan should be communicated to the Prime Minister and Cabinet who should be invited to comment;
- the GoJ should establish the PROC;
- the PROC should sign off on the report and action plan;
- the Commissioner of Police should sanction the completion of the existing JCF RMP (due to be completed in July 2008) to ensure that gains made under that programme are not lost and to maintain momentum for change;
- a communications plan should be developed to shape and manage communications during implementation. It is critical that communication to both JCF and the public begin as soon as the content of the report is announced and the JCF and the MNS must be prepared to communicate;
- as some of the recommendations affect external stakeholders, such as the Ministry of Justice and the MoFPS, the MNS should share the main recommendations contained in the Report with them and invite their feedback and comments;
- the content of the report and action plan should be communicated to the Police Officers’ Association and the Police Federation and they should be invited to comment;
- the content of the report and action plan should be communicated to JCF staff who should be given a chance to feedback their views and concerns;
- the content of the Report and Action Plan should be communicated more generally to other external stakeholders – including the public;
- the JCF should appoint an implementation manager;
• funding should be sought from donors to fund the programme where necessary;
• the Commissioner of Police should identify with the PROC, the PSC and the MNS, which recommendations can be achieved with little effort or expenditure and make arrangements for immediate implementation.